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INTRODUCTION

In their respective paramount articles, Strong and
Koch describe the apparent tension between the law of
arbitration and the law of trusts in common law jurisdictions
with expressions such as “Two Bodies of Law Collide” or “A
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Tale of Two Cities.”3 On one hand, much of this current
tension is reportedly caused by the equity nature of the trust
institution in Anglo-American law. On the other hand, the
tension also arises from arbitration laws that require
arbitration agreements to be contained in contracts or for
such agreements to be related to contracts. We embarked on
the interesting task of determining whether the same tension
exists between the law of trusts in civil law jurisdictions and
arbitration laws modeled by the UNCITRAL Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model
Law). In particular, we chose to focus on the Mexican trust,
arguably the first and most influential trust instrument in
the civil law world, and on Mexico’s commercial arbitration
law (which is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985).
As our comparative law analysis progressed, we found out
that some of the points that differentiate the Mexican trust
from its Anglo-American trust ancestor, coupled with the
flexibility that characterizes the UNCITRAL Model Law,
eliminate most of the legal incompatibility reported in some
common law jurisdictions. Profiting from the descriptive
expressions used by our common law colleagues, Strong and
Koch, this work gathers legal evidence and provides a
thorough analysis to answer the question of whether
arbitration and Mexican trusts are “A Couple Made for Each
Other” . . . affirmatively.
Section II of this paper furnishes some important
information about the Mexican trust to set the basis for our
proposition. Section III forecasts the benefits that arbitration

S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45
VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 1157 (2012); Christopher P. Koch, A Tale of Two
Cities! - Arbitrating Trust Disputes and the ICC's Arbitration Clause for Trust
Disputes, 2 Y.B. ON INT’L ARB. 180 (2012).
3
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will ultimately bring to the Mexican trust industry and to the
parties of Mexican trusts. Section IV introduces the main
legal issues that must be carefully considered to achieve the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement in trusts disputes,
from a global perspective. Section V addresses, in minute
detail, the requirements and theories of intent that make an
arbitration agreement enforceable against all trust parties.
Section VI discusses what type of trusts claims are arbitrable
from a Mexican law standpoint. Section VII highlights some
legal capacity rules that may affect the enforcement of
arbitration agreements over parties to a Mexican trust.
Section VIII identifies some procedural and representation
measures to be taken in order to ensure compliance with due
process and the right to be heard principles in the context of
Mexican trust disputes. Section XI analyzes two examples of
mandatory norms of law that could give rise to the public
policy exception for enforcement of arbitral awards in the
context of arbitration of Mexican trusts disputes. Section X
concludes with some reflections on the current perception of
arbitration as a means to resolve Mexican trust disputes and
its future.
II.

THE MEXICAN TRUST

The first Mexican Trust provisions were enacted in
This set of provisions closely followed the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act enacted in the United States in 1922.5 Both
1924.4

See Ley General de Instituciones de Crédito y Establecimientos
Bancarios [LGICEB] [General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking
Establishments],
(Dec.
24,
1924)
(Mex.),
available
at
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/6/2791/16.pdf.
5 LUIS CARLOS FELIPE DÁVALOS MEJÍA, TÍTULOS Y OPERACIONES DE
CRÉDITO: ANÁLISIS TEÓRICO PRÁCTICO DE LA LEY GENERAL DE TÍTULOS Y
4
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the American Act and the Mexican Trust rules regulated the
power and obligations of trustees only.6 None of them dealt
with the trust institution itself. Most of the law of trusts in
the United States was still in the form of judicial precedent,
largely from England.7 Ten years later, in 1932, Mexico
became the first country to codify its trust law in a
comprehensive manner in its Ley General de Titulos y
Operaciones de Crédito (“LGTOC”).8 This was achieved after
two prior significant legislative attempts.9 The U.S.
equivalent, the Uniform Trusts Act of 1937, followed only
five years later.10 The drafts and prior statutes that led to the
trust provisions in Mexico’s LGTOC were clearly based on
the U.S. trust law at the time.11 However, the Mexican trust12

OPERACIONES DE CRÉDITO Y TEMAS AFINES 541 (Oxford Univ. Press, 4th
ed. 2012).
6 The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 661 (1924) (“An Act
concerning liability for participation in breaches of fiduciary obligations
and to make uniform the law with reference thereto.”).
7 John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United
States?, 58 ALABAMA L. REV. 1069, 1069-71, 1081 (2007). In 1935, the
Restatement of Trust gathered the trust law principles developed by
Equity and Common Law Courts. Id. at 1069 n.5.
8 Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito [LGTOC] [General
Law of Securities and Credit Operations], ch. V, sec. I-II, art. 381–407,
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] (Aug. 27, 1932), ultima reforma
June 13, 2014 (Mex.).
9 This was achieved after two prior non-negligible legislative attempts:
the Ley de Bancos de Fideicomisos of 1926 and the Ley General de
Instituciones de Crédito y Establecimientos Bancarios of 1926.
10 MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 541.
11 MARIA EUGENIA RETTEG, UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE FACULTÉ DE DROIT, THE
MEXICAN FIDEICOMISO: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL APPROACH 15
(2009),
available
at
http://www.unige.ch/droit/mbl/upload/pdf/M_moire_RETTEG.pdf
(Mexican “legislators decided to try and adapt the Anglo – Saxon Trust
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was born with a distinctive twist. The LGTOC gave the
Mexican trust an evident contractual character, which
scholars attribute to the influence that the Mexico Federal
Civil Code of 1928 (Mexico FCC) had over the LGTOC.13
Since then, the Mexican trust has become a reference for
many civil law jurisdictions, particularly in Latin American
countries. As a result, today Mexico is one of the major trust
jurisdictions in the civil law world.
A. LEGAL NATURE
Pursuant to Article 381 LGTOC, “[b]y virtue of the
trust, the settlor conveys to a fiduciary institution [trustee]
the property of certain assets or rights, for those to be
destined to lawful and determined goals, entrusting the
fulfillment of such purposes to the fiduciary institution
[trustee].” Because neither the LGTOC nor the Mexico Code
of Commerce (“CCo.”) expressly characterizes the institution
of trust within any of the so-called “sources” of legal
obligations in Mexican law,14 the legal community has

to the Mexican Law. As a result, there were many projects of acts that
tried to establish the fideicomiso in the legislation. The first of these
attempts took place in 1905 with the Limantour Project, which was the
first to adapt the Trust to a Roman law system. The second attempt was
in 1924 with the Creel Project, which was based on the functioning of the
‘American Trusts and Saving Banks’. In 1924 the LGICEB was created
and this second project had an effective influence on the first official
regulation of the Mexican fideicomiso.” (footnote omitted)).
12 Mexican trust means one created and governed under Mexican law.
13 MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 542.
14 Pursuant to Mexican law, obligations may arise out of the following
sources: contracts, unilateral declarations of intent, unjust enrichment,
and torts (responsabilidad extra-contractual due to risk created or strict
liability).
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frequently debated its legal nature. Some scholars argue that
Mexican courts, including the Supreme Court of Justice,
have repeatedly maintained that the Mexican trust is
contractual in nature.15 Other legal scholars maintain that a
trust is a fiduciary transaction that ultimately has the legal
nature of a contract under Mexican law.16
B. PARTIES
Like the Anglo-American trust, there are three main
parties to a Mexican trust: the settlor (fideicomitente), the
trustee (institución fiduciaria), and the beneficiaries
(fideicomisarios). Occasionally a fourth party, a technical
committee, also acts as party to a Mexican trust. A settlor is
required for a Mexican trust to exist. Through the settlor’s
declaration of intent, the first element to create a trust is
accomplished. Both individuals and entities may be settlors
as long as they have the capacity to transfer legal ownership
of the subject matter of the trust, whether assets or rights,
and the legal capacity to enter into commercial agreements.17
In addition, government or administrative bodies may act as
settlors where authorized by their statute and charter.18 This

MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 554-557 (reporting a series of Mexican Supreme
Court decisions upholding the contractual nature of trusts under
Mexican law); see e.g., Fideicomiso, Naturaleza del., Pleno de la Suprema
Corte de Justicia [SCJN], Informe de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, Séptima
Época, Primera Parte, 1986, Tesis 32, Amparo en revision 769/84, 675
(Mex.) (holding that the trust is a legal business through which the
settlor creates a set of independent assets, which is autonomous from the
parties to the contract, which title is granted to the trustee for the
achievement of its determined goal.).
16 MEJÍA, supra note 5, at 560.
17 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 384 (Mex.).
18 Id.
15
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work does not address Mexican public trusts, which are
created by the government.19
According to Article 381 of the LGTOC, the trustee is
also a (sine qua non) party to the Mexican trust.20 Only legal
entities (never a natural person) may serve as trustees.
Moreover, only legal entities authorized by law,21 generally

Despite the fact that most of what is submitted in this article will hold
true where a state entity is involved, issues of arbitrability and capacity
would require a more detailed analysis due to the current treatment of
arbitration by Mexican public procurement and administrative rules.
20 Trustee involvement is vital to create a Mexican trust. This conclusion
can be drawn from LGTOC Article 385, which reads as follows: “when as
a result of resignation or removal the trustee concludes its services as
such, a replacement trustee shall be designated. Where this replacement
is not possible, the trust will extinguish.” LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 385
(Mex.) (author’s translation).
21 Id. The following entities are allowed to act as trustees: credit
institutions, insurance companies, guarantee institutions, brokerage
firms, financial corporations with limited capacity to act only in financial
matters, general storage warehouses, the Mexican National Bank, and
National Savings and Financial Services Banks. For general storage
warehouses, see id. at ch.V, sec. II, art. 395; for insurance companies, see
Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros
[LGISMS] [General Law for Insurance Institutions and Companies], ch.
II, art. 34, frac. IV, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO],
(Aug. 31, 1935) (Mex.); for insurance companies, see also Ley de
Instituciones de Seguros y de Fianzas [LISF] [Law for Insurance and
Bond Institutions], ch. I, sec. I, art. 118, Pfo. XXIII, as amended, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], (Apr. 14, 2013) (Mex.); for guarantee
institutions, see Ley Federal de Instituciones de Fianzas [LFIF] [Federal
Law for Bond Institutions], ch. II, art. 16, Pfo. XV, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO], (Dec. 29, 1950) (Mex.); for brokerage firms, see Ley del
Mercado de Valores [LMV] [Law for Stock Market], ch. II, sec. II, art. 183,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], (Dec. 30, 2005) (Mex.); for financial
corporations with limited object, see Ley General de Organizaciones y
Actividades Auxiliares de Crédito [LGOC] [General Law of Auxiliary
Credit Organizations and Activities], title V, ch. 1, art. 87-Ñ, Diario
19
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banks and financial corporations, may request an
authorization from the National Bank and Stock
Commission (“CNBV”)22 to operate as trustee.23 This
authorization covers the trustee’s capacity to act as such.
Pursuant to Article 382 of the LGTOC, any person
with legal capacity to receive the benefits of the trust may be
a beneficiary.24 Furthermore, the beneficiary has to be born,
or at least be conceived, at the time of the settlor’s death in
order to be entitled to receive the benefits of the trust. Also,
unless it is a guarantee trust, the trustee shall not be a
beneficiary of the trust.25
If the settlor so wishes, he may set up a “technical
committee,” either at the trust’s creation or in a subsequent
modification of the trust deed. The settlor determines the
functioning, purpose, rights, members, etc., of the technical
committee.26 The technical committee usually serves as a
supervisory board that ensures the achievement of the
trust’s rules and objectives. For example, the settlor may
stipulate the type of decisions or tasks that shall be

Oficial de la Federación [DO], (Jan. 14, 1985) (Mex.); for the Mexican
National Bank, see Ley Del Banco de México [LBM] [Law for the Bank of
Mexico], art. 7, Pfo. XI, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], (Dec. 23,
1993) (Mex.); for national savings and financial services bank, see Ley
Orgánica del Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros
[LOBANSF] [Organic Law for the National Savings and Financial
Services Bank], ch. II, art. 7, Pfo. VII & VIII, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO], (June 1, 2001) (Mex.).
22 Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores.
23 Ley de Instituciones de Crédito [LIC] [Law for Credit Institutions], ch.
IV, art. 80, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] (July 19, 1990) (Mex.).
24 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 382, Pfo. 1 (Mex.).
25 Id. at Pfo. 4.
26 LIC, ch. IV, art. 80 (Mex.).
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performed by the trustee in accordance with the technical
committee’s instructions.27
C. TYPES
Although the law provides no catalogue of the
different types of trusts under Mexican law, scholarship has
provided one using different criteria, such as: personal
elements, goals, and structure. Types include the irrevocable
trust,28 the investment trust,29 the management trust,30 the
guarantee trust,31 the public trust,32 the testamentary trust,33

Id. Article 80 of the LIC provides that when the trustee is acting upon
the technical committee’s request, as long as these instructions are lawful
and in accordance with the trust’s purpose, the trustee will not be held
liable for damages. Id.
28 Where the assets are definitively transferred to the trustee with no
possibility for the settlor to revoke such transfer.
29 The life insurance trust and retirement plan (for employees) trust,
among others, are generally structured as an investment trust.
30 The ultimate purpose of this trust is to transfer all the managerial work
related to the assets and have the settlor benefit from them (by
designating himself as beneficiary).
31 This type of trust is expressly regulated by the LGTOC in Articles 395406. LGTOC, ch. V, sec. II, arts. 395-406 (Mex.) (listing the institutions
and corporations that are allowed to act as trustees in these trusts in art.
395). In these types of trusts, trustees are allowed to act as beneficiaries
when the trust is created to provide a guarantee in benefit of the trustee.
Id. at art. 396.
32 This type of trust is created for the purpose of assisting the executive
branch of the government in the promotion and support of certain
activities for the social and economic development of the country; its
purpose is of public interest always.
33 This type of trust is settled by a unilateral declaration of intent made
by the settlor, and takes effect after his death. The trustee is given the
task to manage the assets. The persons designated as beneficiaries must
be alive or at least conceived at the time of the settlor’s death LGTOC. It
27
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and those trusts that are unlawful, such as the secret trust
and the successive trust.34
D. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN
TRUSTS
The Anglo-American trust and the Mexican trust are
very similar since the former is modeled after the latter (see
Section II above). Notwithstanding this fact, the Mexican
trust differs from the Anglo-American trust in some
important ways. Unlike the Anglo-American trust, which is
considered to create a legal relationship that arises out of an
equitable obligation (see Section V below),35 the Mexican
trust is considered a contract (see Section II.A. above). In
addition, pursuant to Mexican law, only institutions
expressly authorized by law may serve as trustees (see
Section II.B. above); under the Anglo-American trusts law,
any capable person, either an individual or a legal entity,
may serve as trustee.36 Likewise, Mexican law of trusts
establishes a clear restriction to the designation of
beneficiaries who shall exist or at least be conceived at the

is revocable and becomes irrevocable after the death of the settlor.
LGTOC, ch. V, art. 394, frac. II (Mex.).
34 The purpose of every trust must be made perfectly clear; failing to do
so will have the consequence of presuming that its purpose is secret and
this would cause it to be null and void under Mexican law. In addition,
Mexican law prohibits trusts in which the benefit is given to several
persons that should substitute each other successively upon the death of
the previous beneficiary. The only exception to this principle is when
beneficiaries are alive or conceived at the moment of death of the settlor.
35 JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
386, 387 (9th ed. 2013); ALASTAIR HUDSON, UNDESTANDING EQUITY &
TRUSTS 12 (2d ed. 2004).
36 ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY & TRUSTS 237-38 (3d ed. 2003).
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time of the settlor’s death (see Section II.B. above). This is not
so with the Anglo-American trust.37 Moreover, under the
Anglo-American law of trusts it is possible for the same
person or entity to be the trustee and beneficiary or the
settlor and trustee at the same time, so long as the same
person does not assume all three capacities (settlor, trustee
and beneficiary).38 Under Mexican law, the trustee may
never be a beneficiary because this makes the trust null and
void (unless the settlor creates a guarantee trust).39 AngloAmerican trusts may be settled in an implied or oral
fashion,40 unlike the Mexican trusts, which are only valid in
writing.41
E. THE APPLICATION OF MEXICO’S COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION LAW TO MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES
Pursuant to Article 1 of the LGTOC, all acts and credit
operations falling under its scope of application are deemed
“acts of commerce.”42 Accordingly, the Mexican trust is an
act of commerce. As such, the Mexican trust is also governed
by the provisions of Mexico’s CCo. and the relevant banking

DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 35, at 417.
Id. at 402.
39 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. II, art. 396 (Mex.).
40 “The United States’ law of trusts does not require a writing to create a
valid trust. However, in the United States a testamentary trust must be in
writing to satisfy the Wills Act, and an inter-vivos trust of land to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds.” See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 35, at 427.
41 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.).
42 Mexican law still follows the old dichotomy that distinguishes between
civil acts primarily governed by the civil code provisions and the socalled acts of commerce primarily governed by the Mexico Code of
Commerce and mercantile laws.
37
38
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and trade usages.43 However, a Mexican trust may involve
parties (i.e. settlors or beneficiaries) that are non-traders or
that do not pursue any business objective in the trust.44 In
this scenario, scholars would find that such a Mexican trust
might be considered a “mixed act,” where those non-trader
parties to the Mexican trust will enjoy the special treatment
granted by the civil code provisions.45 We agree that some
mandatory rules of law contained in the civil code and other
non-commercial law statutes shall apply to non-trader
parties (see e.g. Sections VII.B., VIII, and IX below).
However, we submit that the provisions on commercial
arbitration in Articles 1415-1480 of the CCo. shall govern
arbitration disputes arising out of Mexican trusts
(particularly where the seat of arbitration is in Mexico),
irrespective of whether one or more non-trader parties are
involved in the trust relationship. We find support in Article
1050 of the CCo., which provides that whenever an act has a
business nature for one of the parties and a civil nature for

LGTOC, art. 2o (Mex.). Acts of commerce are those falling within the
definition established by the same Code of Commerce, irrespective of the
persons who perform those acts (see Código de Comercio [CCo.]
[Commercial Code], art. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], (Dec. 13,
1889) (Mex.)). Generally, an act of commerce pursues a goal of economic
speculation or a profit purpose, which does not need to be expressed in
the contract, but is rather assessed on a case-by-case basis. (see id. at art.
75, fracs. XIV & XXIV (Mex.)).
44 So-called civil transactions are executed by parties who do not
ordinarily enter into the transaction with a profit purpose and cannot be
considered as traders under the Mexico Code of Commerce or as
suppliers under Mexico consumer protection law. See generally Código
de Comercio [CCo.] [Commercial Code], Diario Oficial de la Federacion
[DO], (Dec. 13, 1889) (Mex.).
45 SOYLA H. LEÓN & HUGO GONZALEZ GARCÍA, DERECHO MERCANTIL 155
(2007).
43
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the other party, any dispute that arises out of the transaction
at stake will be governed by the business law (i.e. the
CCo.).46 Against this background, a Mexican trust will
always have a business nature for at least one of the (sine
qua non) parties: the trustee. Therefore, the arbitration
provisions in any of the civil codes of the thirty-one Mexican
states shall not apply to the resolution of trust disputes.
III.

BENEFITS OF ARBITRATION FOR THE TRUST INDUSTRY AND
THE PARTIES INVOLVED
A. ECONOMIC BENEFITS: A FAST AND FLEXIBLE PROCEDURE

Litigation is not always as fast and effective as it
should be. This ultimately results in increased costs for the
parties. Various elements affect the resolution of disputes in
state courts. For instance, state courts are frequently
overloaded with cases and understaffed.47 The issuance of
court decisions takes quite some time, and after a decision is
delivered to the parties, the decision is inevitably subject to a
number of expensive and time-consuming appeals.48

Código de Comercio [CCo.] [hereinafter “Commercial Code”], art.
1050, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], (Dec. 13, 1889) (Mex.)
(“Cuando conforme a las disposiciones mercantiles, para una de las
partes que intervienen en un acto, éste tenga naturaleza comercial y para
la otra tenga naturaleza civil la controversia que del mismo se derive se
regirá conforme a las leyes mercantiles.”).
47 This is at least the case in Mexico. OECD Economic Surveys Mexico,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 22, ¶ 31
(Jan. 2015), http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Mexico-Overview2015.pdf.
48 In the OECD area, the average length of civil proceedings is around
240 days in the first instance, but in some countries a trial may require
almost twice as many days to be resolved (in Mexico: 342 days). Final
46
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Arbitration provides a cost-effective option for dispute
resolution of trust disputes.49 One of the main advantages of
arbitration is that proceedings take substantially less time
than litigation.50 This benefit is especially appealing to
parties involved in trust disputes. The trust’s goal could be
completely lost if a dispute were to last for years in
litigation.51 Arbitral proceedings are put to an end by the
issuance of an arbitral award, which is final and binding for
the parties. This feature of the award has a direct impact on
the time that is invested in the resolution of a dispute simply
because it is not subject to any appeal mechanisms.52
Furthermore, arbitral tribunals do not depend on the courts’

disposition of cases may involve a long process of appeal before the
higher courts, which in some cases can average more than seven years.
Guiliana Palumbo et al., Judicial performance and its determinants: a crosscountry perspective 38 (OECD Economic Policy Paper No. 5, 2013),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/FINAL%20Civil%20Justice%20Polic
y%20Paper.pdf.
49 Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration Clauses in Trusts: The U.S.
Developments and a Comparative Perspective, REVISTA PARA EL ANÁLISIS DEL
DERECHO (INDRET) 6 (2008); Strong, supra note 3, at 1182.
50 It has been reported that arbitration proceedings in Mexico normally
last a year, plus the enforcement stage. Claus von Wobeser, Arbitration
Guide: MEXICO, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION 2 (May 2013), available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=8A787
6EB-EBB9-4D5F-B073-24618471E911.
51 Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and
Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 627, 635-36 (2011).
52 ALAN REDFERN ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 34 (5th ed. 2009) (“Although the initial cost is not likely to
be less than that of proceedings in court, the award of the arbitrators is
unlikely to be followed by a series of costly appeals to superior local
courts.”).
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calendar. Arbitration meetings are easily coordinated, and
the disputes are resolved considerably faster.53
Moreover, most litigation in state court follows a very
formalistic approach in the conduct of the proceedings. This
results in formalities that are often prioritized over the
substance of the dispute. Arbitration proceedings are
tailored to meet the specific requirements of the parties. This
benefit can be particularly valuable for parties to trust
disputes. One of the reasons why settlors usually choose a
trust institution is because of its structural flexibility.54 In
this regard, parties to trust disputes should in principle
prefer flexibility in their dispute resolution mechanism as
well.55
B. INTERPERSONAL BENEFITS: A PERSONALIZED AND
PRIVATE PROCEDURE
Disputes arising out of trusts can be complex. State
judges may lack the expertise needed for a dispute of this
particular kind. Thus, an arbitration panel versed in the
specificities of modern trust law and practice is advisable.
Parties can appoint arbitrators that are qualified for the
dispute at stake, select the rules under which the
proceedings shall be carried out and determine which law
will be applicable to the substantive issues of the dispute,
among other things. If an arbitral tribunal is experienced
enough, it should be able to grasp the decisive issues of fact

Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 6.
Strong, supra note 3, at 1183.
55 Id. at 1173, 1183.
53
54
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and law in the dispute and adapt the procedure in order to
ensure that such issues are properly dealt with.56
Parties to trust disputes will also value the
personalized and high-end service performed by most
arbitral tribunals. As opposed to state court judges,
arbitrators are appointed to handle one specific case from
the beginning to the end. Accordingly, arbitrators get to
know the parties and their counsel better than state judges
do. Most importantly, as the case develops through the
documents filed by the parties, the pleadings, and the
gathering of evidence, arbitral tribunals perform a thorough
analysis of the case and get a proper understanding of it. As
a result, arbitral tribunals are fully qualified to issue sensible
awards that will be suitable for the dispute at hand.57
In addition, arbitration offers a private means of
resolving legal controversies. This, in principle, makes
arbitration confidential to the outside world.58 While parties
to all kinds of contracts appreciate the privacy and
confidentiality that surrounds arbitral proceedings, parties
to trusts could particularly value this feature. This holds true
because, on the one hand, “public forms of dispute
resolution can damage not only the trustee’s own business
reputation but also the reputation of the trust industry as a
whole.”59 On the other hand, settlors and beneficiaries will
probably appreciate that the dispute is kept private. Settlors
of both testamentary and commercial trusts often make use
of trusts precisely because they provide more privacy,

REDFERN, supra note 52, at 32.
Id. at 33.
58 JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 8 (2003).
59 Strong, supra note 3, at 1183.
56
57
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discretion, or tax and wealth management optimization than
other contractual alternatives.60
Furthermore, privacy will attract parties to
testamentary trusts because in state courts, issues that may
be embarrassing to the parties are publically discussed
during the probate process.61 Likewise, parties to business
trusts may have an interest in protecting valuable
information such as trade secrets, ownership of assets,
credit-lines, competitive practices, or any delicate detail that
could be subject to adverse publicity.62
IV.

ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
MEXICAN TRUSTS

Arbitration agreements contained in Mexican trusts
are presumed enforceable in accordance with the New York
Convention and modern arbitration laws. One of the main
objectives of the New York Convention and modern
arbitration laws, including Mexican arbitration law,63 is to
make arbitration agreements readily enforceable.64 Article
II(1) of the New York Convention provides that Contracting
States shall recognize an arbitration agreement made

Id. at 1172-73.
Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 6.
62 REDFERN, supra note 52, at 32.
63 Mexican arbitration law is found in Articles 1415-1480 of the
Commercial Code. Its provisions are largely, if not completely, based on
the original UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration of 1985. Commercial Code, art. 1415-80 (Mex.).
64 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 145, 147 (4th ed. 2013).
60
61
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between parties.65 Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
also provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements,
regardless of the arbitral seat.66 The same principle is
embodied in Article 1424 of the CCo.67
The presumption of enforceability of an arbitration
agreement in a Mexican trust deed is the rule and the New
York Convention and modern arbitration laws limit
exceptions to this rule. Possible exceptions relate only to
issues of form validity (e.g. the in-writing requirement),
substantive validity (the lack of intent or impaired intent),
non-arbitrability of the subject matter, and lack of legal
capacity by one of the parties.68 All of these exceptions
require strong evidence in order to make an arbitration
agreement unenforceable.69 Accordingly, state courts and
arbitral tribunals will always enforce an arbitration
agreement in a Mexican trust by referring the parties to
arbitration unless one party furnishes evidence that the
arbitration agreement relied upon is null and void,
inoperative, or incapable of being performed.70 The above

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. II(1), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter “N.Y.
Convention”].
66 U.N. Comm'n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on
Commercial Arbitration, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.V.4 (2008) [hereinafter “UNCITRAL Model Law”].
67 Commercial Code, art. 1424 (Mex.).
68 Commercial Code, arts. 1415, 1423, 1424, 1457, 1462 (Mex.).
69 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA'S
GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A
HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 45 (2011).
70 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. II(3); UNCITRAL Model Law,
supra note 66, at art. 8(1); Commercial Code, art. 1424; INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 69, at 38.
65
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may include legal evidence that the subject matter of the
dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration.71
The exception of lack of form validity may scarcely
arise in the context of Mexican trust disputes. Under
Mexican law, a trust deed shall be made in writing.72 An
arbitration clause contained therein will therefore also fulfill
the writing requirement established in Article I(1) of the
New York Convention and Article 1423 CCo.
With regard to issues of substantive validity, i.e.
whether a party’s intent to arbitrate exists and is free of
mistake, fraud, unconscionability, and duress, etc., these will
be treated by state courts and arbitral tribunals under the
applicable general contract provisions.73 The severability
principle of the arbitration agreement in modern arbitration
laws74 (Art. 1432 CCo.) will possibly trigger the application
of a law to the arbitration agreement other than the law
governing the underlying Mexican trust between the parties.
Depending on the approach taken at the seat of arbitration,
i.e. the lex arbitri, the question of which law applies to the
substantive validity of the arbitration agreement could be
easy or complex to answer. In arbitrations seated in France,
case law provides that the existence and effectiveness of an
arbitration agreement is to be assessed on the basis of the

N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a); Commercial Code, arts.
1415, 1457 (I)(a) & (II), 1462 (I)(a) & (II).
72 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.).
73 BORN, supra note 64, at 148.
74 Id. at 146 (“In many nations, including all major trading states, an
arbitration agreement is presumptively ‘separable’ from the underlying
contract in which it appears. National arbitration legislation often
expressly so provides (See UNCITRAL Model Law Article 16; Swiss Law
on Private International Law Article 178(3); U.S. Federal Arbitration Act
§2; German Civil Procedure Act Article 1040(1)).”).
71
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parties’ common intention alone, with no need to refer to
any national law.75 Under other arbitration laws, which do
not contain a conflict of law rule on the applicable law to the
arbitration agreement per se (i.e. Mexico arbitration law), the
severability principle can give rise to more complex
decisions on the law relevant to determining the substantive
validity of an arbitration agreement contained in a Mexican
trust deed. A uniform solution to this issue is nevertheless
found in the New York Convention and in other proenforcement arbitration laws. Article V(1)(a) of the New
York Convention76 and Article 1462(I)(a) of the CCo.77 both

A determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreements is
not required under the French law on arbitration, in the absence of an
express choice of law to govern the arbitration agreements. Municipalité
de Khoms El Mergeb v. Soc. Dalico, Dec. 20, 1993, Revue de l’Arbitrage,
KLUWER ARBITRATION (1994), at 117. “By virtue of a substantive rule of
international arbitration, the arbitration agreement is legally
independent of the main contract containing or referring to it, and the
existence and effectiveness of the arbitration agreement are to be
assessed, subject to mandatory rules of French law and international
public policy, on the basis of the parties’ common intention, there being
no need to refer to any national law.” Identifying the governing law of
the arbitration agreement thus becomes unnecessary. All that matters is
that the parties consent to refer disputes to arbitration.
76 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a) (“Recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused . . . [where] the said agreement
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made.”).
77 Commercial Code, art. 1462(I)(a), which is modeled after Article
36(1)(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 66, at art. 36(1)(a) (stating that “(1) Recognition or enforcement of an
arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be
refused only: . . . [where] the said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made.”).
75
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provide that absent any specific choice of law by the parties
to that effect, the substantive validity of an arbitration
agreement is determined by the law of the country where
the award is made. In other words, by the contract law at the
place of arbitration.78 In Section V below, we address some
questions regarding proper formal and substantive intent to
arbitrate disputes arising out of Mexican trusts.
The non-arbitrability exception refers to the parties’
restriction to submit a dispute to arbitration.79 Virtually all
countries’ laws exclude certain categories of matters from
resolution by arbitration.80 Each country has specific policy
reasons and criteria to remove a class of claims from the
realm of arbitration.81 A matter that is arbitrable under the
law of one country may not be capable of resolution by
arbitration under another country’s law. For example, some
arbitration laws deem arbitrable only disputes over rights
the parties are free to dispose of.82 Other more liberal laws
deem arbitrable all disputes involving claims of a financial

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 31(3)
(2006) [hereinafter “ICC ARBITRATION RULES”].
79 Also called “objective arbitrability,” as opposed to “subjective
arbitrability,” which concerns whether a party by its own nature is
restricted to enter into arbitration agreements because of a policy
consideration to protect that party before State courts. LOUKAS A.
MISTELIS & STAVROS L. BREKOULAKIS, ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL &
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 6 (2009).
80 BORN, supra note 64, at 148.
81 MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79, at 4 (“Certain disputes may
involve such sensitive public policy issues that it is felt that they should
only be dealt with by the judicial authority of state courts. An obvious
example is criminal law which is generally the domain of the national
courts: it is undisputed that the sanctioning of criminal activity is in the
power of the judiciary.”).
82 CODE JUDICIARE [C.JUD.] art. 1676(1) (Belg.).
78
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nature.83 The arbitration laws based on the UNCITRAL
Model Law do not usually set forth which disputes are
arbitrable.84 Instead, UNCITRAL-based laws, like the
Mexican arbitration law, take the approach of defining the
scope of arbitrability through the exclusion of certain
matters via statutory provisions that expressly give exclusive
jurisdiction to specific State courts.85 The determination of
the law governing the arbitrability of disputes can thus be an
important strategic question and not an easy one. In practice,
State courts have relied on the conflict of laws rule in Article
V(2)(a) of the New York Convention, or its equivalent
domestic arbitration law,86 in order to apply their own
national law to determine the arbitrability of the dispute at a
pre-award (jurisdictional) stage or a post-award stage (in a
setting aside claim or enforcement claim).87 Arbitral
tribunals similarly tend to apply the law at the place of
arbitration in order to determine the arbitrability of the
subject matter (lex loci arbitri and mandatory rules of law).88
This trend may be influenced not only by the fact that the
applicable norms and standards of the seat of arbitration are
easy to identify, but also by the arbitrators’ natural wish to
shield their awards against setting aside claims at the place
of arbitration. In Section VI, we will address the arbitrability
of disputes arising out of Mexican trusts.

LDIP, art. 177(1) (Switz.); ZPO, § 1030, para. 1 (Ger.).
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at art. 1(5) (providing that it
does not intend to affect other laws of the adopting State that preclude
certain disputes being submitted to arbitration).
85 Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.).
86 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(b)(i), 36(1)(b)(i);
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.).
87 MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79, at 12, 13.
88 Id. at 13.
83
84
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The exception for lack of legal capacity of one of the
parties to the arbitration agreement is equally relevant in the
context of trust disputes. Article V(1)(a) of the New York
Convention provides that the recognition and enforcement
of an award may be denied where the parties to the
arbitration agreement were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity.89 However, the New York
Convention does not define the law governing the issue of
capacity90 or power91 to enter into an arbitration agreement.
Under the traditional conflict of laws method, the law
governing legal capacity is determined differently
depending on whether it relates to natural persons or legal
entities. With regard to natural persons, traditional choice of
law rules of France or Germany would deem applicable the
law of their nationality.92 On the contrary, some countries’
conflict of laws rules, particularly in common law
jurisdictions, but also in Mexico,93 favor the application of
the law of the country where the natural person concerned
has his or her domicile as the connecting factor.94
With respect to capacity of legal entities, the approach
is not uniform in domestic laws either. The conflict of laws

N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a).
PHILIPPE FOUCHARD ET AL., FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 242 (1999).
91 Fouchard et al., correctly point out the confusion regarding capacity
and power. Capacity relates to the natural or legal person’s legal
possibility under the law to act on its own name and on its own account.
Power relates to the legal possibility to act on behalf of and for the
interest of a legal or natural person. Id.
92 Id. at 244.
93 Código Civil Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], art. 13(II), Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] (May 14, 1928), últimas reformas DOF
Dec. 24, 2013 (Mex.).
94 FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 244.
89
90
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rules of some jurisdictions, like France, would designate the
application of the law of the country where the legal entity
has its headquarters (siege social). Conversely, under other
legal systems, including Mexico’s,95 the capacity of legal
entities is assessed in accordance with the law of
incorporation or registry.96
The validity and scope of powers of representation
are governed by different laws. Absent an express choice of
law by the principal and agent, an agency relationship shall
be governed by either the law where the authorization was
granted,97 the law where the principal has its headquarters,98
or the law where the authorization ought to be performed,99
depending on the relevant conflict of laws rule applied.
In both, issues of capacity and power of
representation, arbitrators face the challenge of deciding
which conflict of laws rule they will apply. As arbitrators
have no forum, and thus are not bound by the conflict of
laws rules of State courts at the seat or any possible place of
enforcement, arbitrators enjoy flexibility to select the conflict
of laws rules they deem appropriate. Some scholars see risks

Federal Civil Code, art. 2736 (Mex.) (designating the law of
incorporation to determine the existence, legal capacity, object, and
functioning of legal entities).
96 FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 245.
97 Inter-American Convention on the Legal Regime of Powers of
Attorney, (Jan. 16, 1975), 1438 U.N.T.S. 267.
98 Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, art. 6, (Mar. 14, 1978), 16
I.L.M. 775; Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1837(1) (Fr.).
99 Federal Civil Code, art. 13(V) (Mex.) (however, pursuant to Federal
Civil Code, art. 13(IV), issues of form validity of a power of
representation may be determined by the law of the place where the
power was granted); Código Civil [C.C.] art. 39 (Port.); Código Civil
[C.C.] art. 21 (Spain); Suprema Corte, [Paraguay Supreme Court]
18/5/2001, Diego Pizziolo v. Nereo Tiso y Otros, 224.
95
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in resorting to the conflict of laws method since, in view of
the different approaches above described, it is impossible to
ensure a uniform approach.100 In practice, arbitrators will
apply either the conflict of laws rule which they are most
familiar with or the forum judge conflict of laws rules of the
place of arbitration or enforcement because of the natural
tendency to render a valid and enforceable award. However,
as none of these approaches may lead to a uniform and
satisfactory solution, some scholars, particularly from
France, have argued for the application of substantive law
concepts considered essential in an international context
instead of performing a complicated conflict of laws
exercise.101 For example, the rule that “any natural person
carrying on an economic activity on a professional basis is at
least presumed to have capacity to enter into arbitration
agreements relating to that activity.”102 In section VII below,
we will address issues of capacity and representation of
natural and legal persons usually involved in a Mexican
trust disputes.
V.

CONSENT TO ARBITRATE

As stated above, most countries’ arbitration laws will
give effect to arbitration proceedings provided there is an
agreement by the parties to that effect (see Section IV above).
Therefore, the enforcement of an arbitration agreement over
one party depends first and foremost, upon the existence of
that party’s intent, otherwise called ‘consent,’ to arbitrate. In
most legal systems, agreements or contracts are the product

FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 244, 246.
Id. at 248.
102 Id.
100
101
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of a process of offers and acceptances.103 For instance, a
buyer makes an offer to enter into a sales contract whereby it
undertakes to buy a number of goods for a given price and
to settle any dispute arising thereof in arbitration. A seller
accepts the terms of such an offer, creating a contract with
the buyer. The parties may have achieved a profitable
bargain out of it. In addition, their arbitration agreement has
the effect of removing their sales contract from the purview
of state courts. A state court seized to decide a dispute over
that sale contract should, in principle, refer the parties to
arbitration because an arbitration agreement “operates” over
those parties.104
In the context of Anglo-American trust law, the issue
arises as to whether the act of creating a trust, which may
contain an arbitration provision in the trust deed, is an
agreement to arbitrate as required by the New York
Convention and by national arbitration laws.105 The issue is
of significance because under Anglo-American law, trusts
are not contracts.106 Indeed, the unilateral transfer of
property and declaration of trust by the settlor alone creates
a trust.107 There is no need for an offer and an acceptance for
a trust to exist.108 Accordingly, the legal relationship

INGEBORG SCHWENZER et al., GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW 130
(Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
104 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. II(3).
105 Koch, supra note 3, at 189.
106 Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration
Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious And Costly Trust
Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42 A.B.A. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
351, 357 (2007); S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlers: How Proper Language Can
Increase the Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47
REAL PROP., TR. AND EST. L. J. 275, 291 (2012).
107 Koch, supra note 3, at 101.
108 Strong, supra note 3, at 1174.
103
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between the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiaries is not
strictly contractual in nature.109 In spite of the fact that the
trustee may be paid for its services or even sign the trust
deed, the trustee’s fee will arise out of a collateral contract
that does not form part of the trust.110
It follows from the above that arbitration provisions
contained in a trust deed may not constitute an agreement
between the parties covered by the trust relationship either.
Indeed, state courts in the United States have considered
that the unilateral declaration by the settlor per se could
hardly be construed as an expression of intent by the
trustees or beneficiaries to arbitrate any disputes arising
thereof.111 In Schoneberger v. Oelze,112 decided by the Arizona
Court of Appeals in 2004, the trust contained a provision
stating that “any dispute arising in connection with this
Trust, including disputes between Trustee and any
beneficiary or among the Co-trustees, shall be settled by . . .
negotiation, mediation and arbitration.”113 When the
beneficiaries brought claims against the trustees of two
related family trusts, the latter moved for arbitration on the

Koch, supra note 3, at 189.
HUDSON, supra note 36, at 42.
111 See e.g., Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612-13 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (discussing the statutory and case law restrictions to arbitration
clauses in trusts. “[Appellant] contends the trial court erred by denying
her motion to compel arbitration under the California Arbitration Act,
Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 et seq., because the Trust contains
an arbitration provision and the Trust is a contract. We disagree. The
applicability of the California Arbitration Act requires the existence of a
contract.”), as modified on denial of reh'g (June 8, 2011), review granted and
opinion superseded by Diaz v. Bukey, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011) and cause
transferred by 287 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2012); Murphy, supra note 51, at 639-42.
112 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
113 Id. at 1080.
109
110
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basis of the above-mentioned arbitration agreement.114 In
response, the beneficiaries contended that the arbitration
provisions were unenforceable because trusts are not
contractual agreements and, as non-signatories of the trust
deeds, they had never agreed to arbitrate their claims against
the trustees.115 In deciding in favor of the beneficiaries, the
court explained the nature of Anglo-American trusts in the
following terms:
The legal distinctions between a trust and a
contract are at the heart of why [the
beneficiaries] cannot be required to arbitrate
their
claims
against
the
defendants.
Arbitration rests on an exchange of promises . .
. . In contrast, a trust does not rest on an
exchange of promises. A trust merely requires
a trustor to transfer a beneficial interest in
property to a trustee who, under the trust
instrument, relevant statutes and common law,
holds that interest for the beneficiary. The
“undertaking” between trustor and trustee
“does not stem from the premise of mutual
assent to an exchange of promises” and “is not
properly characterized as contractual.”116
In spite of the above, common law scholars and courts
have recently advanced different theories in order to
conclude that arbitration provisions in trust deeds are

Id.
Id. at 1081.
116 Id. at 1083 (quoting In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ariz. App.
1999)); see also Bruyere & Marino, supra note 106, at 358-60; BosquesHernández, supra note 49, at 16-17.
114
115
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binding agreements between the parties covered by the trust
relationship.117 In Rachal v. Reitz,118 the Supreme Court of
Texas reversed an early decision by its court of appeals119
concluding that an arbitration provision in a trust deed
could not be enforced under the Texas Arbitration Act
(TAA) because a binding arbitration provision must be the
product of an enforceable contract,120 and a contract does not
exist in the trust context. This is in part because there is no
consideration and in part because the trust beneficiaries
have not consented to such a provision.121 The Supreme

See e.g., Bruyere & Marino, supra note 106, at 361-62 (submitting that
the distinction between contracts and trusts no longer makes sense in
U.S. law. The distinction was due in large part to the works of Austin W.
Scott, who published an article in the Columbia Law Review in 1917 on the
inability of contract law to enforce the trust terms because English
contract law “did not recognize a third-party beneficiary contract, a
recognition essential to enforcing trust agreements.”). However, this has
changed in modern U.S. contract law where agreements for the benefit of
a third party are now enforceable. See Murphy, supra note 51, at 645-61
(addressing the theoretical shortcoming of the current characterization of
a trust as something other than a contract; anticipating the “benefit
theory” that would later on be applied in Rachal v. Reitz by the Supreme
Court of Texas, which gave effect to an arbitration agreement in a trust
deed; and addressing the donor’s “Intent Theory” as one of the means to
enforce arbitration agreements, though admitting that only few
jurisdictions give unlimited effect to a donor’s intent). See also BosquesHernández, supra note 49, at 8-12.
118 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013), reh'g denied (Aug. 23, 2013).
119 Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App. 2011) rev'd, 403 S.W.3d
840 (Tex. 2013).
120 Id.
121 See id.; see also Nancy E. Delaney et al., Rachal v. Reitz and the Evolution
of the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 27
PROB. & PROP. 12, 12 (2013) (commenting on the background and Texas
Supreme Court decision); see also Steven K. Mignogna, Increasing
Enforceablity of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trust, N.J. L. J.
117
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Court of Texas held that the intent of the legislature in the
Texas Arbitration Act was to enforce arbitration provisions
in agreements “to arbitrate future disputes” as well as
formal contracts.122 In Diaz v. Bukey,123 the Supreme Court of
California instructed the court of appeal to vacate its
decision to refuse the enforcement of an arbitration
provision in a trust deed on grounds of lack of a written
contract and to reconsider the cause in light of Pinnacle
Museum Tower Ass’n. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US),
LLC.124 In addition, new legislation in some states within the
United States has been recently enacted addressing this
issue.125 In fact, the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals
in Schoneberger v. Oelze126 was superseded by state legislation
providing that “[a] trust instrument may provide
mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to resolve
issues between the trustee and interested persons or among
interested persons with regard to the administration or
distribution of the trust.”127 Florida and Hawaii have also
adopted specific legislation expressly recognizing the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in trusts.128

(2013), available at http://law-articles.vlex.com/vid/enforceabilityclauses-wills-trusts-458312134; Christopher S. Moore, Texas Enforces
Arbitration Clause in Trust Agreement, 17 ALT. DISP. RESOL. 21, 22 (2013).
122 Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 844; Mignogna, supra note 121; Delaney et al.,
supra note 121, at 13-14; Moore, supra note 121, at 23 (commenting on the
Rachal court’s reasoning).
123 287 P.3d 67, 67 (Cal. 2012).
124 See generally id.
125 See e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10205 (2012).
126 Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1078.
127 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-10205.
128 Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 18; Murphy, supra note 51, at
665-69.
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Despite the above doctrines and recent legislation of
some states endorsing the enforcement of arbitration
provisions in trust deeds, there is still some jurisprudential
uncertainty on the issue in many common law
jurisdictions.129 Proponents of arbitration advise that
theoretical difficulties can be overcome through careful
drafting of provisions that create contractual obligations in a
trust.130 Appropriate wording may read,
[A] settlor on behalf of himself and the
beneficiaries deriving their interests through
him, expressly contracts in the trust
instrument with the trustee . . . that in
consideration of undertaking the office of
trustee . . . any breach of trust claim against the
trustees shall be referred to arbitration.131
Aware of this issue and the potential of the trusts
market for arbitration, two important arbitration institutions,
the ICC Court of Arbitration and the American Arbitration
Association, propose model arbitration clauses tailor-made
for trust disputes. The extended text of these clauses
evidences the fragility of arbitration agreements in trust
deeds and the need to shield the arbitration proceedings

129

See Murphy, supra note 51, at 639; Delaney et al., supra note 121, at 14-

16.
Koch, supra note 3, at 190; Strong, supra note 106, at 307-09; Tina
Wüstemann, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 33, 44-45 (Christoph Müller
ed., 2007); Delaney, et al., supra note 121, at 16.
131 Strong, supra note 3, at 1179-80 (quoting UNDERHILL & HAYTON: LAW
RELATING TO TRUSTS & TRUSTEES ¶ 11.84 (David Hayton et al., eds., 18th
ed. 2010)).
130
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against lack-of-intent challenges and other due process
issues involving the parties to a trust relationship.132

132

The ICC Clause alone reads:
All disputes arising out of or in connection with the
trust created hereunder shall be finally settled under
the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber
of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed by
the ICC International Court of Arbitration (the
‘Court’), in accordance with the said Rules.
The settlor hereby agrees to the provisions of this
arbitration clause and the trustees, any protector and
their successors in office, by accepting to act under the
trust, also agree or shall be deemed to have agreed to
the provisions of this arbitration clause. Accordingly,
they all agree to settle all disputes arising out of or in
connection with the trust in accordance with this
arbitration clause.
As a condition for claiming, being entitled to or
receiving any benefit, interest or right under the trust,
any person shall be bound by the provisions of this
arbitration clause and shall be deemed to have agreed
to settle all disputes arising out of or in connection
with the trust in accordance with this arbitration
clause.
If, at any time, any person requests to participate in
arbitral proceedings already pending under the
present arbitration clause, or if a party to arbitral
proceedings pending under this arbitration clause
desires to cause any person to participate in the
arbitration, the requesting party shall present a
request for joinder to the Court setting forth the
reasons for the request. It is hereby agreed that if the
Court is prima facie satisfied that a basis for joinder
may exist, any decision as to joinder shall be taken by
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However, not every jurisdiction experiences this type
of “collision of bodies of law” or “tale of two cities”
experience, as described by Strong133 or Koch,134
respectively, to describe the apparent tension between the
law of arbitration and the law of trusts in common law
jurisdictions. Indeed, many jurisdictions, particularly civil
law countries that have their own domestic version of trusts,
view this legal institution as contractual in nature.135 As
mentioned in Section II, the Mexican trust is a contract. In
this regard, the enforcement of arbitration provisions in
Mexican trusts shall not encounter the same type of

the Arbitral Tribunal itself. When taking a decision on
the joinder, the Arbitral Tribunal shall take into
account all relevant circumstances, including, but not
limited to, the provisions of the trust and the stage of
the proceedings. It is further agreed that the Court
may reject the request for joinder if it is not so
satisfied, in which case there shall be no joinder. In
case of a joinder after the signature or approval of the
Terms of Reference, an amendment to the same will be
made either through signature by the parties and the
Arbitral Tribunal or through approval by the Court,
pursuant to Article 18 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration.
It is agreed that in such a case, the Court may take
whatever measures that it deems appropriate with
respect to the advance on costs for arbitration.
ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB.
BULL. 9 (2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search “ICC
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes” and follow “Commission Report”
hyperlink).
133 Strong, supra note 3.
134 Koch, supra note 3.
135 Strong, supra note 3, at 1180.
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challenge. As further addressed below, mutual intent to
arbitrate will generally exist between the settlor of a Mexican
trust and the designated trustees pursuant to Mexican
arbitration law and most other arbitration laws.136 In
addition, intent to arbitrate will also exist between the
trustee and non-signatory beneficiaries of a Mexican trust.137
A. INTENT TO ARBITRATE BY SETTLOR AND THE TRUSTEE(S)
IN A MEXICAN TRUST
Typically, the settlor of a Mexican trust will express
his intent to transfer specific assets in trust to be held or
managed by a designated trustee (an authorized financial
institution in Mexico)138 for clearly identifiable beneficiaries
pursuant to the terms established by the settlor. These trust
terms will generally include dispute resolution and
applicable law provisions. Arbitration may be chosen by the
settlor as the means to resolve any dispute that may arise out
of the formation, interpretation, performance, and
termination of the trust created. In practice, the designated
trustee will participate in the negotiation and entering into
of the trust. The trustee’s intent to be bound by the terms of
the trust will usually be recorded in the trust deed. The first
question that arises is whether the arbitration provision
therein could be enforced against the trustee and the settlor
pursuant to Mexican law.139 The second question is whether
the same arbitration provision in the same Mexican trust

See discussion infra § A.
See discussion id. § B.
138 See discussion infra § II. B.
139 See discussion infra § II. A. 1.
136
137
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could (more easily) be enforced against the trustee or the
settlor in common law systems, (e.g., U.S. or English law).140
1. ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN A
MEXICAN TRUST PURSUANT TO MEXICAN LAW
Pursuant to Article 1415 of the CCo., the arbitration
law of Mexico will apply to national and international
arbitrations when the place of the arbitration is in Mexico.141
Accordingly, an arbitration clause in a Mexican trust deed
that selects Mexico as the place of arbitration, or absent such
selection when the arbitral tribunal so determines (pursuant
to Article 1436), will be governed by the provisions in
Articles 1415 et seq. (i.e. by Mexico’s arbitration law).
With regard to form validity, Article 1423 provides
that an arbitration agreement shall be “in writing.”142 This
requirement is met if the arbitration agreement is recorded
in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of
letters, telex, telegrams, faxes, or other means of
communication, which provide a record of the arbitration
agreement.143 In addition, the reference in a contract to a
document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an
arbitration agreement, provided that the contract is in
writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part
of the contract.144 Going back to the typical means to express
intent by a settlor and a trustee of a Mexican trust, the form
validity requirement in Article 1423 would be satisfied with

See discussion infra § II. A. 2.
Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.).
142 Commercial Code, art. 1423 (Mex.).
143 Id.
144 Id.
140
141
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the settlor’s and trustee’s signing of a trust deed containing
an arbitration clause. Moreover, the same requirement
would also be met if—notwithstanding the lack of the
trustee’s signature on the deed—the trustee’s services
agreement with the settlor makes reference to the trust deed
which contains the arbitration clause. Although less typical
in practice, an arbitration agreement recorded in writing will
also satisfy the form requirement in Article 1423 if the
settlor’s or the trustee’s agreement to be bound by the trust
terms is implied by conduct. An example would be where
the settlor transfers the assets that are the subject matter of
the trust to the trustee, pursuant to the terms of an unsigned
trust deed, or where the trustee begins managing the assets
transferred by the settlor under the trust terms before a deed
is signed. As has been held by courts and arbitration
tribunals applying Article 7 of the UNICTRAL Model Law of
1985—upon which Article 1423 of the CCo. was modeled—
the intent shall not necessarily be articulated in writing by
all parties: only a record of the agreement upon which a
party relies need exist.145 This also means that implied intent
to be bound by an arbitration agreement will satisfy the inwriting requirement, irrespective of who may have drafted
the arbitration agreement at stake. As explained by the Swiss
Supreme Court in its decision of October 16, 2003, the form
requirement only applies to the agreement itself, but not to
the intent by any of the parties. The question of the

Schiff Food Products Inc. v. Naber Seed & Grain Co. Ltd. (1996), 149 Sask.
R. 54 Can. Sask. Q.B.; Achilles (USA) v. Plastics Dura Plastics (1977)
ltée/Ltd. (2006) QCCA 1523 (Can.).
145

38

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

subjective scope of an arbitration agreement is determined
by means of the classic theory of acceptance of contracts.146
Following this line of thought, the next step in
establishing the existence of an agreement between the
settlor and the trustee in a Mexican trust dispute regards
issues of substantive validity, i.e. whether the settlor’s or
trustee’s intention to arbitrate was lawfully exercised and
given free of abuse or misconceptions, etc. Because Mexico’s
arbitration law does not cover these matters, the latter shall
be determined by a different set of law provisions. As
discussed above, Article V(1)(a) of the New York
Convention and Article 1462(I)(a) of the CCo.147 uniformly

Tribunal fédérale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 16, 2003,
4P.115/2003, 129 Arrêts Du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse (Recueil Officiel)
[ATF] III 727 (Switz.). “However, this formal requirement only applies to
the arbitration agreement itself, that is to say the agreement (arbitration
clause) by which the original parties have mutually expressed their joint
intention to arbitrate. As to the question of the subjective scope of a valid
arbitration agreement under Art . 178 al. 1 Swiss PILA – this is about
determining which parties are bound by the agreement or if a third party
that is not designated nevertheless falls within its scope ratione personae
– this regards the substance and should therefore be resolved in the light
of art. 178 al. 2 Swiss PILA.” In the original decision in French,
“[t]outefois, cette exigence de forme ne s'applique qu'à la convention
d'arbitrage elle-même, c'est-à-dire à l'accord (clause compromissoire ou
compromis) par lequel les parties initiales ont manifesté réciproquement
leur volonté concordante de compromettre. Quant à la question de la
portée subjective d'une convention d'arbitrage formellement valable au
regard de l'art. 178 al. 1 LDIP - il s'agit de déterminer quelles sont les
parties liées par la convention et de rechercher, le cas échéant, si un ou
des tiers qui n'y sont pas désignés entrent néanmoins dans son champ
d'application ratione personae -, elle relève du fond et doit, en
conséquence, être résolue à la lumière de l'art. 178 al. 2 LDIP.”
147 Commercial Code, art. 1423 (Mex.) (modeled after Art. 36(1)(a) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, which states, “(1) Recognition or enforcement
of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made,
146

2015

ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES

39

answer this question designating the law of the country
where the award is made to be the contract law at the place
of arbitration (see Section IV above).148 Accordingly, in
arbitration proceedings in Mexico, either by parties’ choice
or by the tribunal’s decision (CCo., art. 1436), the provisions
on obligations and contracts in Mexico’s CCo. and the
Federal Civil Code (“CC”) will determine the existence of
the arbitration agreement from a substantive point of view.
As under most, if not all, laws in the world, Mexico’s
contract law endorses the principle of freedom of contract,
whereby agreements may be reached through the parties’
express or implied consent (by conduct) to be bound by their
terms.149 Limits on freedom of contract are nevertheless
established by provisions on validity where at the
conclusion of the contract, primary principles protected by
the law are considered to be at risk. Examples of such
principles are: (i) the lawfulness of the transaction (illegality,
immorality, and impossibility which could hardly arise in
the context of an arbitration agreement); (ii) the free and
informed will to contract (mistake, unfair terms in adhesion
contracts, fraud, and duress); and (iii) the bargaining balance

may be refused only: (a) at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, if that party furnishes to the competent court where recognition
or enforcement is sought proof that: (i) a party to the arbitration
agreement referred to in article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected
it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made”).
148 Pursuant to Article 31(3) of the 2012 ICC Rules, “the award shall be
deemed to be made at the place of the arbitration.” ICC ARBITRATION
RULES, art. 31(3).
149 See generally EDGARDO MUÑOZ, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
SALES IN LATIN-AMERICA, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 94, 103 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer 6th ed., 2011).
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of the deal (gross disparity (lesión) situations which rules do
not apply to business deals in Mexico).150
It is worth mentioning that under the severability
principle of arbitration agreements in Article 1432 of the
CCo., an arbitral tribunal’s decision to void a Mexican trust
does not entail in itself the annulment of the arbitration
agreement therein. A party seeking the annulment of an
arbitration agreement must specifically prove the
substantive validity grounds in relation to the arbitration
agreement itself.
2. ENFORCEMENT OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN A
MEXICAN TRUST PURSUANT TO U.S. OR ENGLISH
ARBITRATION LAWS
Increasingly, foreign entities and foreign persons are
parties to a Mexican trust as either settlors or beneficiaries.
Therefore, it is possible that a settlor and a trustee (or in lieu
of them, the arbitral tribunal) designate a seat of arbitration
outside Mexico to resolve any dispute arising out of a
Mexican trust. The reasons for choosing a place of arbitration
outside Mexico are many: neutrality, confidentiality, high
bargaining power of the settlor, origin or place of deposit of
the assets to be transferred in trust, etc.
Because the place of arbitration would determine both
the lex arbitri as well as the law applicable to the substantive
existence of an arbitration agreement,151 the question is

Id. at 169, 209.
That would be the uniform conflict of laws rule to be taken—absent
an agreement by the parties on the law applicable to the arbitration
clause—pursuant to Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention as well
as under the English Arbitration Act 1996, sec. 2(1).
150
151
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whether an arbitration provision in a Mexican trust could be
enforced against the trustee or the settlor in common law
systems. Issues of form validity impairing the effect of an
arbitration agreement in a Mexican trust are unlikely to arise
in these jurisdictions. Both the English Arbitration Act152 and
the United States Federal Arbitration Act153 will give effect to
any arbitration agreement “in writing.” The requirement of
“in writing” also limits itself to the arbitration provision. It
does not require consent to be necessarily given by all
parties in such a manner.154 As mentioned above, the typical
conclusion of a Mexican trust involves preparing a written
document outlining the terms pursuant to which the settlor
conveys the assets to the trustee.155 The settlor and the
trustee will most likely sign the written deed before the
trustee becomes the legal depositary or manager of the
assets on trust. Lack of signature would not empty the
arbitration agreement of its binding effect over the settlor or
trustee if their implied acceptance of the trust terms can be
inferred by conduct. Yet, the question whether the settlor or
trustee subjectively agreed on the arbitration agreement will
have to be answered by the contract law provisions at the

English Arbitration Act 1996, ch. 23, § 5.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2 §§ 1-14 (2012).
154 English Arbitration Act 1996, § 5 provides that “ . . . (2) there is an
agreement in writing— (c) if the agreement is evidenced in writing or (3)
Where parties agree otherwise than in writing by reference to terms
which are in writing, they make an agreement in writing. (4) An
agreement is evidenced in writing if an agreement made otherwise than
in writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the
authority of the parties to the agreement.”
155 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.) (“[T]he creation of a trust shall
always be made in writing.”).
152
153
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place of arbitration, and not by the lex arbitri (since the latter
does not contain that sort of provisions).156
In this regard, the issue of characterization of the
arbitration claims will be key. As previously addressed,
trusts in Anglo-American jurisdictions derive from the law
developed by equity courts.157 Accordingly, “with limited
exceptions, the remedies of trust beneficiaries are equitable
in character and enforceable against trustees in a court
exercising equity powers.”158 The remedies or claims within
a trust are thus not contractual in nature. As the comment to
§ 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) explains:
A trustee who fails to perform his duties . . . is
not liable to the beneficiary for breach of
contract . . . The creation of a trust is conceived
as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the
trust property rather than as a contract . . .
Further, the trustee by accepting the trust and
agreeing to perform his duties . . . does not

Clausen v. Watlow Electric Mfg. Co., 242 F.Supp. 2d 877, 882
(D.Or.2002); “The [Federal Arbitration Act] ‘creates a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability, enforceable in both state and federal
courts and pre-empting any state laws or policies to the contrary’ . . . .
The FAA, however, does not preempt state law regarding the ‘“validity,
revocability and enforceability of contracts generally.”’ . . . Thus, to
resolve the issue whether the parties entered into a valid and enforceable
written agreement to arbitrate, the court must apply general, state-law
principles of contract interpretation.” Id. at 1049 (citations omitted).
157 ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 45-47 (Routledge. 8th ed.
2014).
158 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
156
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However, the trust created pursuant to Mexican law
differs from the Anglo-American trust. The Mexican trust is
a contract (see Section II.B. above). Parties and arbitrators
should bear in mind that the claims in a Mexican trust are
contractual ones. More importantly, because a Mexican trust
is contractual in nature, the traditional process of offer and
acceptance (or the more modern process of step-by-step
negotiations) of the trust terms will in principle also lead to
reaching an agreement on the arbitration clause therein.
Accordingly, the inclusion of an arbitration agreement in a
Mexican trust should not give rise to the type of discussions
currently affecting the enforceability of arbitration
provisions in Anglo-American trusts (see Section V above).
Arbitrators in the United States or England apply the
contract law rules of those jurisdictions to determine the
substantive existence of the arbitration agreement.
Arbitrators should not apply the Anglo-American trust rules
at all in order to establish the nature of a Mexican trust. Any
issue regarding the Mexican trust (separate from the
arbitration agreement) including its nature, scope,
interpretation, and effect should be decided by the law
pursuant to which such trust was settled, i.e. Mexican law.
B. INTENT TO ARBITRATE BY BENEFICIARIES OR CLASS OF
BENEFICIARIES IN A MEXICAN TRUST
As mentioned above, the Mexican trust is created
upon the agreement by the settlor and trustee of the terms of

159

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
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the trust (see Subsection A above).160 Participation of the
beneficiaries in the execution of the trust agreement is not a
requirement for the existence of a Mexican trust. Mexican
law gives effect to trusts that do not designate any
beneficiary–the latter may be designated subsequent to the
creation of the trust.161 Accordingly, the question arises as to
whether an arbitration provision in a Mexican trust binds
beneficiaries who did not consent to its terms at the time of
creation.
State courts and arbitral tribunals have extended
arbitration agreements to non-signatories using rules or
theories such as agency, alter ego, implied consent, group of
companies, estoppel, third-party beneficiary, guarantor,
subrogation, legal succession and ratification, assumption,
etc.162 Two legal theories, however, seem to fit well with the
trust institution and appear to be useful in bridging the
initial gap between the creation of the trust and the
subsequent acceptance of the trust terms by beneficiaries.
The first relies on civil law rules on stipulation pour autrui163
or provision in favor of a third party. The second is rooted in

LGTOC, art. 381 (Mex.).
Id.
162 See generally Bernard Hanotiau, Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a
Common Vision?, 27 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 539, 551 (2011);
Bernard Hanotiau, Non-signatories in International Arbitration: Lessons from
Thirty Years of Case Law, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO
BASICS? (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2006).
163 Stipulation pour autrui is a contract or provision in a contract that
confers a benefit on a third-party beneficiary. A stipulation pour autrui
gives the third-party beneficiary a cause of action against the promisor
for specific performance. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW
(1996).
160
161
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the common law doctrine of equitable estoppel,164 where an
equal solution can also be reached under the good faith
principle in civil law systems.
1. THE SETTLOR’S PROVISION IN FAVOR OF A THIRD PARTY
(CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS)
The legal purpose of the trust is to obtain some
benefit out of the assets transferred to the trustee. In view of
this, Mexican law provides that the settlor will designate the
beneficiaries to receive the benefits that the trust
encompasses.165 Although beneficiaries are considered
parties to Mexican trust agreements by most scholars (see
Section II.B. above), technically beneficiaries only become
parties to the trust when they decide to exercise the rights
assigned to them in accordance with the trust terms. In the
meantime, however, beneficiaries (who did not expressly
assume the role of parties at the time of the trust’s creation)
are legally related to the settlor and the trustee as third party
beneficiaries.
The contract law doctrine of third party beneficiary
has its roots in medieval law.166 Pursuant to Article 1121 of

Equitable estoppel prevents one party from taking a different position
at trial than she did at an earlier time if the other party would be harmed
by the change.
165 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 382 (Mex.).
166 Jan Hallebeek, Contracts for a Third-Party Beneficiary: A Brief Sketch from
the Corpus Iuris to Present-Day Civil Law, 13 FUNDAMINA 11, 14 (2008) (“By
the end of the Middle Ages both the civilians and the canonists, who
adopted the Roman alteri stipulari rule, considered it possible for
contracting parties to stipulate validly that something be given or done
to a third-party beneficiary and to bring it about that this third party
could enforce what was stipulated in his favour.”).
164
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the French Civil Code, “[a] party may stipulate a benefit for
a third party as a condition regarding a stipulation that it
makes for itself or concerning a gift that it makes to another
party.”167 The rule is an exception to the principle of privity
of contracts.168 Article 1165 of the French Civil Code
recognizes the exception, stating: “[a]greements produce
effects only between the contracting parties; agreements do
not affect and benefit third parties except as provided in
article 1121 [provision in favor of a third party].”169
Beneficiaries of a trust deed are potentially affected by and
benefit from the terms of the trust as if they were under the
doctrine of stipulation pour autrui. It is just a matter of time
before the beneficiaries’ become fully bound by the trust
terms, including any dispute resolution clause.
Mexico’s Federal Civil Code (CC) embodies the same
provisions.170 Article 1870 of the CC provides further that
“the rights of the designated third party arise at the time of
the contract conclusion, unless the contracting parties retain
the power to impose conditions expressly established in
the agreement as they consider appropriate” (emphasis

The original reads, “On peut pareillement stipuler au profit d'un tiers
lorsque telle est la condition d'une stipulation que l'on fait pour soimême ou d'une donation que l'on fait à un autre. Celui qui a fait cette
stipulation ne peut plus la révoquer si le tiers a déclaré vouloir en
profiter.” Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1121 (Fr.).
168 The doctrine of privity in the common law of contract provides that a
contract cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on
any person or agent except the parties to that contract.
169 The original reads, “Les conventions n'ont d'effet qu'entre les parties
contractantes ; elles ne nuisent point au tiers, et elles ne lui profitent que
dans le cas prévu par l'article 1121.” Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art.
1165 (Fr.).
170 Federal Civil Code, arts. 1869-1872 (Mex.).
167

2015

ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES

47

added).171 In this regard, arbitration specialists in Mexico
submit that even if this doctrine arguably does not impose
obligations but grants benefits to third parties,172 Article 1870
validates the view that parties are free to attach to the
benefits stipulated in favor of a third party collateral clauses
which form part of the whole transaction.173
Against this background, an arbitration provision in a
trust deed will not only cover disputes between the trustee
(promisor) and the settlor (promisee), but also those disputes
regarding the stipulation itself (the benefits). In light of the
fact that the benefits of a trust concern the beneficiary, the
arbitration clause binds the beneficiary as part of the
transaction designed by the original parties.
That being said, beneficiaries must show their intent
to be bound by the arbitration provision in the trust deed. As

The original reads: “El derecho de tercero nace en el momento de
perfeccionarse el contrato, salvo la facultad que los contratantes
conservan de imponerle las modalidades que juzgue convenientes,
siempre que éstas consten expresamente en el referido contrato.” Federal
Civil Code, art. 1870 (Mex.).
172 The discussion arose out of Francisco Gonzalez de Cossio’s first
proposal to see an arbitration agreement as an obligation of the type of a
condition precedent to be fulfilled by the third party in order to obtain
the benefits stipulated in its favor. Francisco Gonzalez-de-Cossio, El Que
Toma el Botín, Toma La Carga: La Solución a Problemas Relacionados con
Terceros en Actos Jurídicos que Contiene un Acuerdo Arbitral e Involucra
Terceros, 14-16 (2012) [hereinafter “Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2012”].
However, in the two further essays referenced below González de Cossio
seems to concede that historically, the third parties could not be
burdened with obligations but rather only afforded rights, prompting
the author to revisit the nature of an arbitration agreement in that case.
Francisco Gonzalez-de-Cossio, El Que Toma el Botín, Toma la Carga: La
Idea Gana Adeptos, 5-8 (2013) [hereinafter “Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2013”].
173 Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2013, supra note 172, at 6-8; see also González-deCossio – 2012, supra note 172, at 1-3.
171

48

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 23

addressed above (see Section V.A.1. above), the “in writing”
requirement in Article 1423 of the Commercial Code shall
not be an issue. Mexican trusts must also be created in
writing.174 Therefore, written evidence of the arbitration
agreement will be contained in the trust deed. Pursuant to
Article 1423, the beneficiaries’ intent need not necessarily be
articulated in writing.175 Beneficiaries’ implied intent to be
bound by an arbitration agreement satisfies the in-writing
requirement. The question of whether conduct shows intent
is determined by means of the classic theory of contract
formation and interpretation.176

LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 387 (Mex.).
Schiff Food Products Inc. v. Naber Seed & Grain Co. Ltd, [1996] 149 Sask.
R. 54 (Can. Que.); Achilles (USA) v. Plastics Dura Plastics, [1977] 2006
CCQA 1523 (Can. Que.).
176 Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 16, 2003, 129 III
727, ARRÊTS DU TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE (ATF) (Switz) (“However, this
formal requirement only applies to the arbitration agreement itself, that
is to say the agreement (arbitration clause) by which the original parties
have mutually expressed their joint intention to arbitrate. As to the
question of the subjective scope of a valid arbitration agreement under
Art . 178 al. 1 Swiss PILA- this is about determining which parties are
bound by the agreement or if a third party that is not designated
nevertheless falls within its scope ratione personae – this regards the
substance and should therefore be resolved in the light of art. 178 al. 2
Swiss PILA.”). In the original decision in French, “[t]outefois, cette
exigence de forme ne s'applique qu'à la convention d'arbitrage ellemême, c'est-à-dire à l'accord (clause compromissoire ou compromis) par
lequel les parties initiales ont manifesté réciproquement leur volonté
concordante de compromettre. Quant à la question de la portée
subjective d'une convention d'arbitrage formellement valable au regard
de l'art. 178 al. 1 LDIP - il s'agit de déterminer quelles sont les parties
liées par la convention et de rechercher, le cas échéant, si un ou des tiers
qui n'y sont pas désignés entrent néanmoins dans son champ
d'application ratione personae -, elle relève du fond et doit, en
conséquence, être résolue à la lumière de l'art. 178 al. 2 LDIP.”
174
175
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As an authority on Mexican arbitration submits, there
may not be a clear way to show intent to be bound by an
arbitration agreement than a beneficiary’s will to exercise a
right conferred by the contract that comprises an arbitration
agreement.177 Although not originally a party to such
contract, accepting to profit out of the rights therein shall
amount to that party’s acceptance of the whole combo,
including the arbitration provision.178
The same result has been achieved under similar
common law doctrines. Pursuant to the doctrine of “deemed
acquiescence,” beneficiaries who receive some type of
benefit under the trust are deemed bound by the terms of
the trust, including any arbitration clause therein.179 The rule
has been drawn in part from the language found in section
82(2) of the English Arbitration Act, reading “a party to an
arbitration agreement includes any person claiming under or
through a party to the agreement.” In that order of ideas,
any beneficiary who draws his interest in the trust from the
settlor and whose rights and obligations are determined by
the trust deed is considered to have consented to the
arbitration agreement.180 As put by some scholars, the
doctrine lies on the premise that “by accepting the settlor’s
bounty the beneficiary is deemed to have also accepted the
conditions under which the settlor is willing to have the
beneficiaries profit from his/her bounty, which includes the
agreement to arbitrate.”181

Gonzalez-de-Cossio – 2013, supra note 172, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
179 Strong, supra note 3, at 1211.
180 Id.
181 Koch, supra note 3, at 190.
177
178
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Should a settlor wish to avoid the interpretive task of
proving consent by any designated beneficiaries, she may
consider drafting a trust deed in a way that deems
benefitting from the trust terms as an implied agreement to
submit disputes to arbitration.182 The ICC Court of
Arbitration suggests the following wording in its model
trusts dispute clause:
As a condition for claiming, being entitled to
or receiving any benefit, interest or right under
the trust, any person shall be bound by the
provisions of this arbitration clause and shall
be deemed to have agreed to settle all disputes
arising out of or in connection with the trust in
accordance with this arbitration clause.183
2. DOCTRINE OF DIRECT BENEFITS ESTOPPEL (U.S. LAW) OR
GOOD FAITH (CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS)
Courts in the U.S. have recently applied a different
(though overlapping) theory to attract non-signatory
beneficiaries to arbitration proceedings.184 Pursuant to the
doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel” a party may be
estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a
written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's

Strong, supra note 3, at 1210.
See ICC ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR TRUST DISPUTES, 19 ICC INT’L CT. OF
ARB. BULL. 9 (2008), available at http://www.iccdrl.com (search "ICC
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes" and follow link for "ICC
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes").
184 Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. 2013); ENGlobal U.S., Inc. v.
Gatlin, 449 S.W.3d 269, 274 (Tex. App. 2014); Greenberg Traurig, LLP v.
National American Ins. Co., 448 S.W.3d 115, 122 (Tex. App. 2014).
182
183
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arbitration clause where that party has consistently
maintained that other provisions of the same contract should
be enforced to benefit him.185 This theory has its roots in the
rule that a third party enjoying direct benefits or exercising
rights like a party under a contract may not challenge the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.186 The rule dates back to
Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., where a District court
found that the “(claimant) cannot have it both ways. It
cannot rely on the contract when it works to its advantage
and ignore it when it works to its disadvantage.”187
More recently, in Rachal v. Reitz the Supreme Court of
Texas considered this rule in the context of a lawsuit in
damages for breach of the trust terms and fiduciary duties
brought by a beneficiary against the trustee.188 In this case,
the beneficiary claimed that the trustee had inappropriately
taken money from the trust estate and thus that the
beneficiary was “entitled to any profits that would accrue to
the trust estate if there had been no breach of trust.”189 The
beneficiary, however, argued that the arbitration provision
contained in the trust deed was invalid as to him for lack of
mutual assent. The court disagreed, holding that:
A beneficiary who attempts to enforce rights
that would not exist without the trust manifests
her assent to the trust's arbitration clause. For

Id.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1473 § 1
(KLUWER L. INT’L. 2014); Janin Blaine-Covington, The Validity of
Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 525, 528
(1967).
187 259 F.Supp. 688, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
188 403 S.W.3d at 847.
189 Id,
185
186
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example, a beneficiary who brings a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty seeks to hold the
trustee to her obligations under the instrument
and thus has acquiesced to its other provisions,
including its arbitration clause. In such
circumstances, it would be incongruent to
allow a beneficiary to hold a trustee to the
terms of the trust but not hold the beneficiary
to those same terms.190
The same solution should be achieved under the
principle of good faith in many jurisdictions. Article 2.A.1 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that “in the
interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its
international origin and to the need to promote uniformity
in its application and the observance of good faith”
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the fact that the
beneficiary’s intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement
must be assessed under the contract law provisions at the
place of arbitration (and not by the lex arbitri, see Section
V.A.1. above), article 2.A.1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
2006 sheds light on the importance of applying the good
faith principle in arbitration matters.191 Relying on the
contract principles of reliance and good faith, the Swiss
Supreme Court in a decision dated April 7, 2014, found that
a non-signatory parent company of the respondent, by
virtue of its statements and behavior, had given the
appearance that it was a party to the contract. The claimant
could therefore believe, in good faith, that the parent

Id.
See generally Bernardo Cremades, Good Faith in International Arbitration,
27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.761, 779 (2012).
190
191
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company was bound by the contracts’ terms, including the
arbitration agreements.192
Although we must still wait to see how State courts
and arbitral tribunals will apply the good faith principle in
the context of trust disputes, there are grounds to conclude
that beneficiaries who maintain an undergoing relationship
with trustees under the umbrella of a trust deed that
includes an arbitration agreement could eventually be
covered by the agreement. The good faith principle works as
an interpretive tool to evaluate a non-signatory beneficiary’s
statements or conduct. If the non-signatory beneficiary’s
conduct or statements are such as to lead the trustees to
reasonably believe that the beneficiary agrees to the terms of
the trust as a whole, the beneficiary shall be deemed covered
by the arbitration agreement.
VI.

ARBITRABILITY OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES IN MEXICO

As introduced in Section IV, the enforceability of an
arbitration agreement will also depend upon whether the
claims in dispute are arbitrable.193 We share the majority
view within arbitration law and practice that this question is
to be determined by the lex arbitri and mandatory provisions
at the place of arbitration, as discussed in Section IV.194 For
the purposes of this article, we will review whether disputes
arising out of a Mexican trust are arbitrable pursuant to

Tribunal federal [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 7, 2014,
4A_450/2013, KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Switz).
193 BORN, supra note 64, at 148; see also MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra
note 79, at 4.
194 N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a); UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(b)(i), 36(1)(b)(i); Commercial Code, arts.
1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.); MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79, at 12-13.
192
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Mexican law. In practice, this would make sense. On the one
hand, settlors and trustees of Mexican trusts will most likely
choose Mexico as a place of arbitration. As previously stated
in Section II.B., under Mexican trust law, only authorized
and registered financial and credit institutions, which are
mainly banks in Mexico, may act as trustees. One could
predict that financial institutions proposing or accepting an
arbitration agreement in a Mexican trust deed will want to
keep the arbitration proceedings under the supervision of
Mexican courts and Mexican mandatory rules of law.195 In
this case, a determination of the arbitrability of Mexican
trusts-related claims would be relevant at the jurisdictional
stage196 or in the case of annulment actions, against the
award.197
On the other hand, in the event parties select a place
of arbitration outside Mexico, or where the arbitral tribunal
so determines,198 the arbitrability rule pursuant to Mexican
law will most likely be relevant at the stage of enforcement
of the arbitration award.199 Since only Mexican-authorized
financial and credit institutions may act as trustees, any
arbitral award that is not voluntarily complied with by the
trustees will have to be enforced in Mexico. In this regard, all
parties involved in a Mexican trust arbitration have a

See infra Section IX.
This is when a review of the arbitrability concept needs to be made by
the arbitral tribunal pursuant to Art. 1434 CCo. Mexico or by Mexican
State courts in accordance with Art. 1424 CCo. Mexico. Commercial
Code, arts. 1424, 1434 (Mex.).
197 See id. at arts. 1457(II), 1462(II); MISTELIS & BREKOULAKIS, supra note 79,
at 12-13.
198 Commercial Code, art. 1436 (Mex.).
199 Where Art. V(2)(a) of the New York Convention becomes relevant. See
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a).
195
196

2015

ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES

55

legitimate interest in knowing whether the scope of
arbitrability under Mexican law could jeopardize the
enforcement of an arbitration award in Mexico.
Lack of arbitrability is a jurisdictional matter. As such,
the arbitral tribunal will determine the arbitrability of trust
disputes under Mexican law. Pursuant to Article 1424 of the
CCo., state courts will only deny effect to an arbitration
agreement where the claim at stake is evidently nonarbitrable upon a summary examination.200 That said, State
courts will have the final decision regarding the arbitrability
of a dispute if asked to intervene in an annulment or
enforcement action pursuant to Articles 1457 (II) and 1462
(II) of the CCo.201
Mexico has a unitary or “monist” arbitration law. A
single set of provisions, Articles 1415-1480 of the CCo.,
govern both domestic and international arbitration
proceedings.202 In contrast to other jurisdictions,203 Mexican

Commercial Code, art. 1424 (Mex.).
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.).
202 Compare Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.) with Commercial Code,
arts. 1461-63 (The Commercial Code will apply to enforcement of
international awards when the seat is outside of Mexico in a country
which has not ratified the New York Convention).
203 See Xavier Favre-Bulle & Edgardo Muñoz, Monismo y dualismo de las
leyes de arbitraje: ¿Son Todas Ellas Dualistas?, ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONAL,
PASADO, PRESENTE Y FUTURO 1449 (Carlos Soto & Delia Marsano ed.,
2013) (The French and the Swiss arbitration laws are dual. A different set
of provisions governs international and domestic arbitration
proceedings. Actually, the notion of arbitrability is defined differently
depending on the international or the domestic nature of the
proceedings.); compare Loi fedérale sur le droit international privé [LDIP]
[Federal Statute on Private International Law] (Dec. 18, 1987), RS 291, art.
177(1) (Switz.) (applicable to international arbitration with a broad
notion of arbitrability), with Code de procedure civile [CPC] [Code of
Civil Procedure] (Dec. 19, 2008), RS 272, art. 354 (Switz.) (applicable to
200
201
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law provides a single notion of arbitrability that applies to
both domestic and international arbitrations.204 The notion of
arbitrability has its starting point in Article 1415 CCo.205
Pursuant to this article, all matters are subject to arbitration
unless other laws stipulate the contrary (A) or provide for
special procedures (B).206 In addition, it is generally
understood that disputes over rights that a person may not
freely dispose of are not arbitrable either (C).207
A. PROVISIONS STIPULATING THAT CERTAIN DISPUTES ARE
NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO BE SOLVED BY ARBITRATION
CCo. Articles 2946-2951 lists the matters that shall not
be resolved by settlement between parties in dispute.208
Arbitration specialists in Mexico maintain that those same
matters are also understood as excluded from the realm of

domestic arbitrations with a narrow notion of arbitrability); Décret 751123 du 5 décembre 1975 Instituant Un Noveau Code De Procedure
Civile [Law 75-1123 of Dec. 5, 2008 Establishing a New Civil Procedure
Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], (Dec. 9, 1975), 12521 (provisions of the French Code
of Civil Procedure applicable to domestic and international arbitrations).
204 Commercial Code, art. 1416(III) (Mex.) (stating that proceedings are
international where (a) parties have their place of businesses in different
countries or the main obligation is to be performed abroad or (b) the
place of arbitration is outside of Mexico).
205 Commercial Code, art. 1415 (Mex.).
206 Id. (stating that Mexican arbitration law applies “unless . . . other acts
provide for a different procedure or that certain disputes are not
arbitrable”).
207 FRANCISCO GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, ARBITRAJE 199 (Porrúa 3rd ed. 2011).
208 Federal Civil Code, art. 2944 (Mex.) (pursuant to Mexican law, a
“settlement” (transacción) is defined as “an agreement by which parties
put an end to any present or future dispute”).
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arbitration.209 The list includes disputes over incapacitated
persons’ or minors’ rights, except where settlement is in
their interest with prior judicial authorization,210 tort liability
arising from crimes,211 the legal status of people and the
validity of marital agreements,212 future claims based on
crime, fraud or intentional harm,213 the right to alimony,214
future inheritance rights,215 and inheritance rights before a
last testament or will is disclosed.216 Article 615 of Mexico
City’s Civil Code provides that the same matters are nonarbitrable.217
In the context of a family trust dispute, the issue may
arise as to whether a claim brought by a tutor or parent on
behalf of a minor or incapacitated beneficiary against the
trustee or settlor may be barred from being decided in
arbitration pursuant to Article 2946 of the CC. We submit
that the purpose of Article 2946 is to afford state court
protection to minors or incapacitated persons in cases where
the claim derives out of rights intrinsic to their personal and
family status. For example, rights over alimony calculation,
inheritance, (but not wills), social benefits, etc. However,
rights that beneficiaries are entitled to pursuant to the terms
of a trust have a different nature. These rights arise out of

GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, supra note 207, at 201.
Federal Civil Code, art. 2946 (Mex.).
211 Id. at art. 2947.
212 Id. at art. 2948.
213 Id. at art. 2950(I), (II).
214 Id. at art. 2950(V); see id. at art. 2949 (for a determination of the amount
of alimony that may be arbitrable).
215 Id. at art. 2950(III).
216 Id. at art. 2950 (IV).
217 See Código Civil para el Distrito Federal [CCDF] [Mexico City Civil
Code], art. 615, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] (Aug. 31, 1928)
(Mex.).
209
210
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the settlor’s wish (not from any legal obligation) to distribute
gifts and wealth among his/her descendants through the
trustees in accordance with the trust terms. The nature of
those rights is purely contractual. Accordingly, no court
authorization should be necessary to make a minor’s or
incapacitated person’s claim arbitrable in such a case. As an
exemption, proper authorization shall be required if the
minor’s or incapacitated person’s claim is based on the
settlor’s legal obligation to provide legal alimony or
allowance to the minor or to the incapacitated concerned. In
such a case, the claim would not even be arbitrable pursuant
to Article 2950(V).218 The rest of the matters covered by
Articles 2946-2951 do not pertain to trusts.
It is worth noting that Panama and Paraguay trusts
laws specifically recognize the arbitrability of trust
disputes.219 Spanish, Bolivian, and Peruvian laws take the
same approach regarding testamentary disputes.220
Historically rooted in the Spanish civil law tradition, these
jurisdictions share similar values of morals and justice with
Mexico. Notwithstanding the fact that no specific provision
in the Mexican trust law (LGTOC) is needed to submit trust
disputes to arbitration, providing for this in the statute
would certainly clear any doubts and avoid this type of
analysis. Arbitration of trust disputes in Panama is

Federal Civil Code, at art. 2950(V); see id. at art. 2949 (addressing the
amount of alimony that may be arbitrable).
219 Bosques-Hernández, supra note 49, at 23-24 (discussing Art. 41 Ley 1
de 1984, 5 de enero (Panamá) and Ley 921, Negocios fiduciaries
(Paraguay)).
220 Id.
218
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becoming more popular every day, making this jurisdiction
even more attractive to international settlors.221
B. MATTERS OF THE EXCLUSIVE PURVIEW OF MEXICAN
COURTS
Pursuant to Article 568 of Mexico’s Federal Code of
Civil Procedure (“Mexico CFPC”), Mexican courts will have
exclusive jurisdiction to decide claims over matters of land
and water resources located within national territory,
resources of the exclusive economic zone or resources
related to any of the sovereign rights regarding such zone,
acts of authority or acts related to the internal regime of the
State and of the federal entities, the internal regime of
Mexican embassies and consulates abroad, and their official
proceedings.222
Claims arising out of private Mexican trusts223 are
unlikely to fall in any of the above categories. The scope of
Article 568(I) Mexico CFPC covers land or water of public
ownership only.224 Therefore, claims arising out of Mexican
trusts which assets in trust consist of non-government lands
or immovable goods are arbitrable. On the other hand,
disputes arising out of so called trusts over immovable

GRANT JONES & PETER PEXTON, ADR AND TRUSTS: AN INTERNATIONAL
340 (2015).
222 Código Federal de Procedimientos Civiles [CFPC] [Federal Civil
Procedure Code], art. 568, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] (Feb. 24,
1928), últimas reformas Jan. 28, 2010 (Mex.).
223 Public trusts, i.e. those involving the Mexican government as one of
the parties and regulated by administrative law are not covered by this
work.
224 Federal Civil Procedure Code, arts. 568(I) (Mex.).
221
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goods located in the Mexican Restricted Zone225 are not
affected either. Arbitrators may not disregard the mandatory
provisions in Article 27(I) of the Mexico Constitution and
Title II of the Mexico Foreign Investment Law.226 In this line
of thought, arbitrators shall apply the ownership restrictions
regarding the real estate transferred in trust. However, this
does not mean that the beneficiaries’ right of using and
developing the land transferred in trust by the settlor are
affected by the non-arbitrability exception. Consequently,
the rights and obligations arising out of that type of trust
agreement are also arbitrable under Mexican law.
Provisions in Mexican law227 that merely define the
territorial jurisdiction among Mexican courts do not
constitute a restriction to arbitration. For example, Article
391 of the LGTOC prohibits trustees from renouncing or
being exempted from performing the trust terms but for
justifiable grounds according to the First Instance Court of
the trustee’s domicile.228 Furthermore, Article 393 provides

In Spanish: “Fideicomisos sobre Inmuebles localizados en la zona
restringida.”
226 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CP] [Political
Constitution of the United Mexican States], Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO] (Feb. 5, 1917), últimas reformás DOF Feb. 10, 2014
(Mex.) (barring aliens from acquiring direct ownership of lands and
waters within a hundred kilometers along the country boarders and
within fifty kilometers of the seacoast); Ley de Inversíon Extranjera
[LIEX] [Mexican Foreign Investment Law], tit. II, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DO] (Dec. 27, 1993), últimas reformás Apr. 9, 2012 (Mex.)
(stating that aliens are only allowed the use and develop real estate
located within this restricted zone, through the creation of a trust).
227 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 381 (Mex.).
228 The authors’ translation. The original in Spanish reads: “La institución
fiduciaria tendrá todos los derechos y acciones que se requieran para el
cumplimiento del fideicomiso, salvo las normas o limitaciones que se
225
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that the First Instance Court of the trustee’s domicile will
also decide the effects of the termination of a trust
agreement, i.e. whether the settlor or the beneficiaries may
receive the remaining assets held in trust by the trustee.229
As stated, these provisions do not give exclusive jurisdiction
to Mexican courts in those matters. Similar provisions are
often found in other civil and commercial law statutes and
have not raised any arbitrability problems in practice.230
Ultimately, their goal is to predict which of the many courts
in Mexico will have jurisdiction, unless otherwise agreed to

establezcan al efecto, al constituirse el mismo; estará obligada a cumplir
dicho fideicomiso conforme al acto constitutivo; no podrá excusarse o
renunciar su encargo sino por causas graves a juicio de un Juez de
Primera Instancia del lugar de su domicilio, y deberá obrar siempre
como buen padre de familia, siendo responsable de las pérdidas o
menoscabos que los bienes sufran por su culpa.”
229 The authors’ translation. The original in Spanish reads: “Extinguido el
fideicomiso, si no se pactó lo contrario, los bienes o derechos en poder de
la institución fiduciaria serán transmitidos al fideicomitente o al
fideicomisario, según corresponda. En caso de duda u oposición respecto
de dicha transmisión, el juez de primera instancia competente en el lugar
del domicilio de la institución fiduciaria, oyendo a las partes, resolverá lo
conducente.”
230 Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [LGSM] [General Law for
Commercial Corporations, arts. 185, 202, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DO] (Aug. 4, 1934), últimas reformás June 13, 2014 (Mex.) (providing for
the intervention of State judges in disputes arising between shareholders
or out of the internal organization of the company. However, these same
disputes are, as a matter of law, susceptible to be solved by arbitration);
Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Arbitrability of (Intra-) Corporate Disputes,
ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 288
(Loukas A. Mistelis & Stravos L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009) (“In modern
arbitration practice and law, first, it is considered that the fact that the
law refers to Court as competent to hear a certain dispute does not
necessarily exclude arbitration.”).
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by the parties in the form of a forum selection clause231 or
arbitration agreement.232
C. DISPUTES OVER RIGHTS THAT A PERSON MAY NOT
DISPOSE OF
Pursuant to Article 6o of the Mexico CC, people may
waive their private rights when doing so does not affect
directly the public order or third parties’ rights.233 This
principle is the basis of other provisions in Mexican law that
expressly invalidate settlement agreements with regard to
claims on rights that parties may not freely dispose of such

Federal Civil Procedure Code, arts. 566, 567 (Mex.) (stating that forum
selection clauses are enforceable in Mexico, unless the selection amounts
to denial of justice or operates only for the benefit of one of the parties
and not for all of them).
232 Cf. Viscasillas, supra note 230, at 288, 289 (“[Brussels Regulation] Art.
22(2) provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the seat in
regards to proceedings which have as their object the validity of the
constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal
persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or of the validity of
the decisions of their organs. [However], apart from the fact that the
Brussels Regulation excludes arbitration from its scope of application, it
establishes the exclusive competence of a national Court in relation to
other national Courts within EU, but not in relation to arbitration.
Arbitral Tribunals are not within the body of national courts and thus it
is wrong to equate the former with the latter.”).
233 The authors’ translation. The original in Spanish reads: “La voluntad
de los particulares no puede eximir de la observancia de la ley, ni
alterarla o modificarla. Sólo pueden renunciarse los derechos privados
que no afecten directamente al interés público, cuando la renuncia no
perjudique derechos de tercero.” Federal Civil Code, art. 6o (Mex.).
231
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as divorce,234 right to alimony, validity of marriage, criminal
matters, etc. (see Section A). Accordingly, rights traditionally
considered as inalienable by private parties will also be
excluded from the realm of arbitration, despite no express
lack of arbitrability stipulated as a matter of law. These
rights may include matters such as parental custody,
adoption, political rights, employment disputes over
salaries, leave and pensions, tax disputes against the state,
the absolute right to inheritance by minors, widows etc.,
despite any testament or will stipulation to the contrary, and
anti-trust disputes.235
Since freedom to dispose of one’s rights means the
possibility to waive such rights, in the context of trusts, the
question is whether beneficiaries can waive the rights
granted by the settlor under the trust terms.236 As it turns
out, beneficiaries can reject any benefits they are entitled to
receive under a trust. Once again, such rights usually result
from settlor’s wish (rather than from any legal obligation) to
distribute wealth among the beneficiaries. Accordingly,
claims arising out of the interpretation and performance of
the trust terms, in principle, relate to rights one can freely
dispose of and thus are arbitrable. Should a specific claim
concern rights one may not freely dispose of, modern
arbitration law and practice will require arbitral tribunals
and state courts to only disallow the specific claim while
allowing the rest of the claims in a trust dispute to
continue.237 In other words, the non-arbitrability of certain

In particular, the jurisdiction to decide a divorce is not arbitrable.
However, the decision as to the amount of alimony due from a former
spouse may be arbitrable.
235 Federal Civil Code, arts. 1368, 1372 (Mex.).
236 Strong, supra note 106, at 302.
237 Id. at 303.
234
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claims in a trust dispute does not result in the nonarbitrability of all trust matters.
VII.

CAPACITY TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION

Full capacity of all parties to the arbitration
agreement in a Mexican trust is required for its effective
enforcement (see Section IV above). Generally, it is settled
that the capacity or authorization to contract on behalf of
another will suffice to establish the capacity to arbitrate.238
However, the question regarding which law arbitrators shall
apply to determine a party’s capacity is not easily answered.
As mentioned above, Article V(1)(a) of the New York
Convention does not set forth the law governing the capacity
or power to enter into an arbitration agreement.239 With that
being said, the delegates at the New York Conference left the
question of which law should govern capacity open so that it
could be answered by the conflict of laws rules of the state
court faced with a motion to deny enforcement of an
arbitration agreement under Article II(3) or of an arbitration
award under Article V(I)(a) New York Convention.240

JEAN- FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 232-233 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti
eds., 2d ed. 2007); Konstantin Razumov, The Law Governing the Capacity to
Arbitrate, PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW
APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 260 (Albert Jan van-denBerg ed. 1996).
239 Despite the fact that pursuant to Art. V(1)(a) of the New York
Convention, the recognition and enforcement of an award may be
denied where the parties to the arbitration agreement were under some
incapacity, the New York Convention does not define the law governing
capacity or the power to enter into an arbitration agreement. See
FOUCHARD ET AL., supra note 90, at 244.
240 POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 239, at 233-34.
238
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Against this background, arbitrators should also
consider applying the conflict of laws provisions of the
forum judge at the place of arbitration or of the state court of
enforcement (although arbitrators are not bound by the
conflict of laws rules of state courts at the place of arbitration
or enforcement).241 This approach helps to shield an arbitral
tribunal’s award against setting aside claims at the place of
arbitration and to enhance enforcement at the relevant
jurisdictions.
In this section, we address questions of capacity that
may arise in the context of arbitration agreements in a
Mexican trust. These questions will be analyzed from the
perspective of an arbitral tribunal seated in Mexico, applying
the Mexican courts’ conflict of laws rules located in the
Mexico CC. On the one hand, Article 13(II) of the CC
provides that the capacity of a natural person is decided by
the law of the country where he/she has his/her domicile.242
On the other hand, Article 2736 states that the capacity of
legal entities is assessed in accordance with the law of their
incorporation.243
A. CAPACITY OF SETTLORS AND TRUSTEES
Pursuant to Article 384 of the General Law of
Securities and Credit Operations a settlor shall have capacity
to transfer the property or rights in trust to the trustees.244 In
this line of thought, a natural person domiciled in Mexico
would have the capacity to act as settlor and to enter into an

Id.
Federal Civil Code, art. 13(II) (Mex.).
243 Id. art. 2736 (Mex.).
244 LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 384 (Mex.).
241
242
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arbitration agreement if he or she has the capacity to contract
on real and personal rights. The general principle under
Mexican law is that any person who has not been declared
incapacitated by law has capacity to contract.245 Under
Mexican law, natural persons lacking capacity to contract
will include minors, those lacking sufficient mental
maturity, and those suffering from mental illnesses or those
affected by circumstances that do not allow them to exercise
their rights. For example, bankrupt traders, the demented,
and prisoners.246 The same provisions govern the capacity of
settlors in the context of business trusts.247
Legal entities have the capacity to transfer and
acquire goods and rights through most of the ways
established by law, just as natural persons do. However, an
entity’s capacity may be limited by law and its documents of
incorporation. For example, a limitation to an entity’s
capacity derives from the company’s object or purpose. In
this sense, a legal entity’s representatives can only bind the
company to those agreements which are within its purpose
of incorporation and according to the scope of authorization
given by the documents of incorporation or bylaws. The law
also imposes limits to certain types of legal persons. For

Federal Civil Code, art. 1798 (Mex.).
Id. at art. 450(I) and (II); see also id. at arts. 1306-1308 (provisions on the
capacity to make a will that may apply by analogy to settlors); RICARDO
TREVIÑO-GARCÍA, LOS CONTRATOS CIVILES Y SUS GENERALIDADES 48, 49
(McGraw Hill 5th ed. 2002).
247 Federal Civil Code, art. 81 (Mex.) (Natural and legal persons must
first have legal capacity under the Civil Codes in order to perform trade
activities. Persons who cannot be bound by their own regular conduct
equally lack capacity to perform commercial transactions. Consequently,
the provisions on legal capacity contained in the Civil Codes are
applicable to the commercial contracts subject to modifications and
restrictions imposed by the Code of Commerce).
245
246
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example, foundations (asociaciones civiles under Mexican law)
are not allowed to have the for-profit trade of merchandise
as their purpose.
In the context of Mexican trusts, unless a legal person
incorporated under Mexican law acting as settlor or any
financial or credit institution authorized to act as trustee,248
is expressly precluded by its articles of incorporation and
internal rules from agreeing to arbitration, nothing in
Mexican law would limit their legal capacity to enter into
such an arbitration agreement.
B. CAPACITY OF MINORS AND INCAPACITATED
BENEFICIARIES
Settlors of family and testamentary trusts frequently
designate beneficiaries who are minors or incapacitated
pursuant to Mexican law, causing two issues to arise. First,
whether a minor or incapacitated beneficiary may consent to
an arbitration agreement. Second, whether a minor or
incapacitated may participate in the arbitration proceedings.
As a starting point, minors lack capacity to contract thus,
any arbitration provisions agreed to by a minor or
incapacitated beneficiary using his or her own name will be
invalid (see Section A above). Yet, parents or tutors could
consent to arbitration on behalf of children or persons under
guardianship.249 The same is valid with respect to a minor or
impaired person’s capacity to present their case before an
arbitral tribunal. Any due process issue would be resolved if
such person is a duly represented by their parents, tutors, or
lawyers.

248
249

LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 385 (Mex.).
GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, supra note 208, at 149.
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With that being said, Mexican law appears to impose
some conditions regarding the above circumstances. On one
hand, Article 424 of the CC provides that minors may
neither appear in trial nor acquire any obligation without the
express consent of their parents.250 Though no reference to
arbitration is made in this provision, one could conclude that
Mexican law requires that a parent manifest consent in an
express manner for a minor to be able to participate in
arbitration proceedings. Pursuant to Mexican contract law,
express consent is manifested verbally, in writing, by
electronic or optic means or any other technology, or
through unequivocal signs.251 In other words, a parent’s tacit
intent resulting from acts or conduct will be insufficient to
bind a minor child to arbitration.252
With regard to persons under guardianship (tutela),
Mexican law conditions a tutor’s freedom to submit the
minor or incapacitated beneficiary’s matters to arbitration
and to nominate arbitrators upon approval by the Mexican
courts.253 It is unclear whether this requirement extends to a
parent-child relationship or whether it is limited to the
tutors- incapacitated minors relationship. One could argue
that it does not extend beyond tutors-incapacitated minors
relationships, since parents are not subject to strict
supervision rules that tutors or guardians are under Mexican
law.254 Different legal treatment resides on the fact that

Federal Civil Code, art. 424 (Mex.).
Id. at art. 1803(I) (Mex.).
252 Id. at art. 1803(II) (Mex.).
253 Id. at arts. 566, 567 (Mex.).
254 See e.g., id. at art. 418 (specific rules stating that guardians are subject
to the same obligations and restrictions established for tutors. However,
no similar rules subject parents to the same obligations and restrictions
imposed on tutors.).
250
251

2015

ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES

69

tutors are designated by law, while parents become
responsible for their children by natural circumstances that
morally lead them to act on their childrens’ best interest with
no need for court supervision. Accordingly, only tutors, not
parents, need the Mexican courts’ authorization to agree
upon and represent minors and incapacitated beneficiaries
in arbitration proceedings arising out of Mexican trust
disputes.
VIII. JOINDER OF PARTIES
Despite the fact that globalization has brought with it
a growing number of multi-party and long-term
relationships, most commercial contracts are short-term and
still only involve two parties. Trust agreements, on the other
hand, involve long-term relationships, which typically last
longer than most commercial contracts. A Mexican trust may
have a 50-year (renewable) term.255 Presumably, more than
one dispute could arise during the trust term. Most
importantly, trust disputes usually involve more than two
parties and occasionally it may not be possible to predict
who those parties will be in advance.256 When a dispute
arises between the trustee and the settlor, it may also involve
the beneficiaries if the claims address the performance of the
trust terms. If the trust indicates a class of persons as
beneficiaries, those who are entitled to the benefits will also
have an interest in joining the arbitration as parties.
Similarly, when a dispute arises between the beneficiaries, it
will most likely also involve the trustee and the settlor if the
matter concerns interpretation of the trust terms.

255
256

LGTOC, ch. V, sec. I, art. 394(II) (Mex.).
Koch, supra note 3, at 185.
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Therefore, arbitration must guarantee some
procedural efficiency in this regard. We submit that
arbitration currently has the tools to meet these particular
needs of trust disputes. Most institutional rules empower the
institution or the arbitrators to decide on joinder issues. For
the purpose of this work, we will address the relevant
provisions in the ICC Rules 2012 and the Mexico Arbitration
Center Rules 2009. Arbitral institutions are increasingly
requested to join parties covered by the same arbitration
agreement during the proceedings.257 Institutions will accept
such requests if all parties participate in the composition of
the arbitral tribunal on equal terms.258 This condition results
from arbitration laws establishing that an arbitral award
may be set aside or refused enforcement if a party was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or if
the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties.259 Article
V(1)(b)(d) of the New York Convention sets forth the same

From 2007 to 2011 the ICC Court of Arbitration handled 55 requests
for joinder of additional parties; 70% involved one additional party, 15%
two additional parties and 15% three or more additional parties. See
JASON FRY ET AL., THE SECRETARIAT’S GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION 98 (Moss
et al., eds. 2012).
258 State courts do not face much difficulty in joinder issues since state
courts can decide to consolidate claims pertaining to the same parties
involved in pending proceedings in a different court or to join additional
parties to current proceedings if their rules on jurisdiction so provide. A
state judge remains neutral before the parties because state judges decide
cases based on territorial, subject matter, or venue rules, but not because
of the parties’ appointment or agreement.
259 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), (iv),
36(1)(a)(ii), (iv); Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b), (d), 1462(I)(b), (d)
(Mex.).
257

2015

ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES

71

grounds for denying the enforcement of arbitration
awards.260
The duty to include all relevant parties to the
arbitration should rest upon the parties themselves, not
upon the arbitral tribunal.261 Preferably, this should happen
at the outset of the proceedings. A beneficiary who requests
arbitration against the trustee shall, in addition, name in his
or her request all beneficiaries of the trust who may
eventually have an interest either as claimant or as
respondent in the proceedings. Similarly, a trustee who
submits a request for arbitration against a beneficiary shall
also name all other beneficiaries who may have an interest in
appearing in the arbitration proceedings as parties.262 Where
the claimant and eventually the respondent properly
designate in their first submission (request for arbitration or
answer to the request, respectively) all claimants and all
respondents concerned by the type of trust claim, the arbitral
institution will ensure notification of the claims and
counterclaims, if any, to all parties mentioned.
Early designation of all parties concerned by any trust
claims will permit a joint nomination of one co-arbitrator by
the group of claimants and/or a joint nomination of one coarbitrator by the group of respondents if a three-member
tribunal is to be constituted.263 Where a sole arbitrator is to

N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(b)(d).
Wüstemann, supra note 130, at 54.
262 Blaine Covington Janin, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust
Instruments, 55 CALIF. L. REVIEW 521, 533 (1967).
263 See e.g., ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(6); RULES OF
ARBITRATION CENTER OF MEXICO art. 16(1) (Centro De Arbitraje De
Mexico,
ed.,
2009),
available
at
http://www.camex.com.mx/images/pdf/reglas%20de%20arbitraje%20
260
261
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be appointed, prompt designation of all parties concerned
will also permit a joint-nomination by all parties.264 Failure
to agree on a joint-nomination by one group alone will
prompt the arbitral institution to step in to appoint all
arbitrators for all parties (claimants and respondents) under
many arbitration rules.265 The purpose of this across-theboard measure (Article 12(8) ICC Rules) is to ensure equality
between the parties in the composition of an arbitral
tribunal.266 As explained in the ICC Secretariat Commentary
on the ICC Rules 2012:
Where all the parties in one side are unable to
agree on a choice of a co-arbitrator, the Court
can deny all the parties in the arbitration the
right to nominate an arbitrator, if appropriate.
This prevents one party or one side from
having a perceived or actual advantage over
the other in respect of the arbitral tribunal’s
constitution.267
Article 12(8) of the ICC Rules addresses the decision
by the French Cour de Cassation in the BKMI v. Dutco case.268
In that case, any dispute had to be solved by a three-member

del%20cam%20adoptadas%20por%20arias%20mexico.pdf
[hereinafter
“CAMEX Rules”].
264 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(3); CAMEX Rules,
supra note 263, at art. 14(3)(a)
265 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(8); CAMEX Rules,
supra note 263, art. 16(2).
266 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(8).
267 FRY, supra note 239, at 258.
268 BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH & Siemens AG v. Dutco Construction,
Cour de Cassation (1er Chambre Civile), Pourvoi N° 89-18708 89-18726,
Jan. 7, 1992, Revue de l’Arbitrage (1992), at 472, KLUWER ARBITRATION.
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arbitral tribunal nominated in accordance with the ICC
Rules.269 Dutco, the claimant, nominated a co-arbitrator who
was confirmed by the ICC Court.270 The ICC Court then
directed the two respondents to nominate their co-arbitrator
jointly.271 The respondents protested against both of them
being required to nominate one co-arbitrator jointly, but
eventually did so.272 When the arbitral tribunal was
composed, the respondents again challenged the
composition of the tribunal arguing that they should have
each been entitled to nominate one arbitrator in order to be
on equal terms with the claimant.273 The arbitral tribunal
dismissed the challenge and the respondents moved to set
aside the award before French court.274 The Cour de Cassation
admitted the challenge holding that all parties are entitled to
equality of treatment, including in the process of selecting
the arbitral tribunal.275

Id.
Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Passage from the decision in the original French language: “qu’il y
était stipulé que tous différends seront tranchés selon le règlement
d'arbitrage de la Chambre de commerce internationale, par trois arbitres
nommés conformément à ce règlement; que, sur la demande d'arbitrage
unique présentée par la société Dutco, séparément, contre ses deux
cocontractantes pour des créances distinctes concernant celles-ci, un
tribunal arbitral a été constitué de trois arbitres dont un désigné
conjointement par les deux défenderesses avec protestations et réserves;
que le tribunal a jugé qu'il avait été régulièrement constitué et que la
procédure arbitrale devait se poursuivre sous la forme multipartite
contre les deux défenderesses.” BKMI Industrienlagen GmbH & Siemens
AG v. Dutco Construction, Revue de l’Arbitrage (1992), at 472, KLUWER
ARBITRATION.
274 Id.
275 Id.
269
270
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The appointment of all arbitrators for both sides by
the arbitral institution eliminates any apparent advantage of
one side over the other regarding the arbitral tribunal’s
composition and is not deemed an infringement of Article
V(1)(b)(d) New York Convention,276 or similar provisions.277
In case a party is requested to be joined to the
proceedings (or a party requests to be joined) after the first
exchange of submissions, arbitral institutions take different
approaches to comply with the parties’ right to participate in
the composition of the arbitral tribunal. The ICC Rules
require the submission of a request for joinder (which has
the same effects as a request for arbitration).278 The request
for joinder shall be made before the confirmation or
appointment of any arbitrator, unless all parties agree
otherwise.279 In practice, the ICC Secretariat will advise the
parties in advance of this cut-off point280 and set a time limit
for filing any request for joinder before any arbitrator is
finally confirmed or appointed. The ICC Court will then
make a prima facie assessment of the existence of an
arbitration agreement covering the additional party.281 A

Since the parties are then deemed to have been given the opportunity
to appoint their arbitrators and the default appointment by the arbitral
institution is made in accordance with the arbitration agreement that
incorporates the arbitral institution’s rules.
277 Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b) ,(d), 1462(I)(b), (d) (Mex.).
278 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 7(1).
279 Id.
280 FRY, supra note 258, at 99.
281 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at arts. 7(1), 6(3-7) (pursuant to
the current rules the Secretariat of the ICC will decide which challenges
to the arbitration agreement shall be decided by the arbitral tribunal and
which shall be referred to the court for a prima facie determination–only
those cases where jurisdiction may be at issue will be referred to the
court); FRY, supra note 258, at 67-68, 95.
276
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timely request for joinder will be subsequently transferred to
the parties concerned by the ICC Court’s Secretariat. The
receiving parties will have thirty days to submit an answer
to the request for joinder.282
The additional party will thus be permitted to jointly
nominate a co-arbitrator with the side it joined pursuant to
Article 12(6).283 Where the additional party is unable to agree
with one of the existing parties on a joint-nomination of a coarbitrator, the institution will appoint all arbitrators for all
parties in accordance with Article 12(8).284
However, the requirement to ensure equal treatment
in the process of composing the arbitral tribunal is not
absolute. If all parties agree, a request for joinder may be
accepted after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.285 In
the context of trust disputes, it should not be uncommon
that a trustee and a beneficiary agree upon other
beneficiaries becoming a party to proceedings after the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Indeed, this issue may
be addressed in advance in the arbitration clause of a trust
deed. The following wording may ensure the joinder of
additional parties in such circumstances:
All disputes arising out of or in connection
with the trust created hereunder shall be
finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of
the [institution] (the “Rules”) by one or more
arbitrators who shall be exclusively
appointed by the [institution]. All parties

ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 7(3).
ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 12(6).
284 FRY, supra note 258, at 150-51.
285 ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 78, at art. 7(1).
282
283
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hereby agree that additional parties may be
joined to the proceedings before or after the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Upon its
constitution, the arbitral tribunal shall decide
any request for joinder in accordance with the
Rules.
The Mexico Arbitration Center Rules do not contain
specific provisions on joinder of parties. However, the same
solution should ensue from Article 16(2) of the Mexico
Arbitration Center Rules.286 A joinder of additional parties
may be possible at any moment before the arbitral tribunal is
constituted. The parties’ freedom to tailor the proceedings
must permit them to agree otherwise in an arbitration clause
or during the proceedings.
IX.

EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN MEXICAN TRUST
DISPUTES

The efficiency of an arbitral award is closely
dependent upon the enforceable character of the arbitration
agreement that gives it origin and the fulfillment of equal
treatment and due process principles. The UNCITRAL
Model Law sets out the reasons for which a court at the
place of arbitration may set aside an arbitral award as well
as the reasons for which a court may refuse enforcement of a
domestic (or a non-New York Convention) arbitral award.287
The reasons for setting aside awards actually mirror those

286
287

CAMEX Rules, supra note 263, at art. 16(2).
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34, 36.
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for refusing enforcement,288 and are inspired by Article V of
the New York Convention.
Most of these reasons, also textually adopted in
Mexican arbitration law,289 have been addressed in the prior
sections of this work. They consider the existence of a valid
arbitration agreement among the parties (Section V
above),290 the arbitrability of the claims at stake (Section VI
above),291 the capacity of the parties to submit to arbitration
(Section VII above),292 and the proper constitution of the
arbitral tribunal (Section VIII above).293
In this section, we focus on one major reason that
arbitral awards are set aside or that parties are denied
enforcement: public policy. Like the other grounds analyzed
above, we will approach the public policy exception from
the Mexican law standpoint.294 The remaining reasons based

Except for the fact that the enforcement court may also considered the
fact that the award has been set aside at the place of arbitration for
denying enforcement. Id. at art. 36(2).
289 Commercial Code, arts. 1457, 1462 (Mex.).
290 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(i) and 36
(1)(a)(i); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a); Commercial
Code, arts. 1457(I)(a), 1462(I)(a) (Mex.).
291 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(b)(i), 36(1)(b)(i);
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(2)(a); Commercial Code, arts.
1457(II), 1462(II) (Mex.).
292 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(i), 36(1)(a)(i);
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a); Commercial Code, arts.
1457(I)(a), 1462(I)(a) (Mex.).
293 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), (iv),
36(1)(a)(ii), (iv); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(i)(b), (d);
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b), (d), 1462(I)(b), (d) (Mex.).
294 This makes sense because settlors and trustees of Mexican trusts will
most likely choose Mexico as a place of arbitration. One could easily
forecast that financial institutions agreeing upon arbitration will want to
keep the arbitration proceedings under the supervision of Mexican
288
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on ultra petita decisions295 or failure to provide proper notice
of the proceedings296 contemplated by the UNCITRAL
Model Law or the New York Convention do not seem to
raise any particular issue in relation to trust disputes.
Like in other jurisdictions, Mexican courts and
scholars have struggled to define what public policy means
in the context of arbitration.297 As a starting point, an arbitral
decision will be set aside or refused enforcement only when
it infringes on “basic notions of moral and justice” of
Mexico’s legal system.298 Yet, nobody would dare to propose
a list of components of Mexican morals and justice.
Therefore, scholars have rather taken the approach of
explaining what public policy in arbitration is not. We share
Gonzalez-de-Cossio’s view that the purpose of this
exception is to prevent giving legal effect to institutions that
are contrary to the most valuable principles of Mexican

courts and Mexican mandatory rules of law. In this case, Mexican public
policy will be relevant in case of annulment actions against the award. In
the event parties select a place of arbitration outside of Mexico, or where
the arbitral tribunal so determines, public policy pursuant to Mexican
law will then be relevant at the stage of enforcement of the arbitral
award. Since only Mexico-based financial and credit institutions may act
as trustees, any arbitration award that may not be voluntarily complied
with by the trustees will have to be enforced in Mexico. In this regard, all
parties involved in a Mexican trust arbitration have a legitimate interest
in knowing whether the Mexican notion of public policy could
jeopardize the enforcement of an arbitration award in Mexico.
295 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii)–(iv),
36(1)(a)(ii)–(iv); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(b)–(d);
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b)–(d), 1462(I)(b)–(d) (Mex.).
296 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), 36(1)(a)(ii);
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(i)(b); Commercial Code, arts.
1457(I)(b), 1462 (I)(b) (Mex.).
297 GONZALEZ-DE-COSSIO, supra note 208, at 797-800.
298 Id. at 800.

2015

ARBITRATION OF MEXICAN TRUST DISPUTES

79

law.299 In this line of thought, it is improper to consider that
an arbitrator’s incorrect interpretation or application of what
are usually deemed mandatory norms of law under Mexican
law constitutes a breach of Mexican public policy. Only
arbitral decisions that go against the mandatory norms of
law that embody basic notions of morals and justice in
Mexico can give rise to the exception of public policy.300
Against this background, this work does not intend to
define the elusive notion of public policy or verify the
accuracy of the contours drawn by Mexican case law or
scholars. In lieu of this, we identify two examples of
mandatory norms of law that could give rise to the public
policy exception in the context of arbitration of Mexican
trusts disputes.301
The first case involves testamentary trusts.302 Certain
mandatory rules of law may affect the validity of a Mexican
revocable trust when the settlor passes away. Pursuant to
Article 1374 of the CC, a testament failing to provide
allowance for the benefit of legally protected dependents
will be invalid.303 These include the deceased’s children,
widows, concubines, parents, and siblings who are
incapacitated to work or do not possess enough assets to

Id. at 801.
Id. at 801-02.
301 Other situations may also raise the public policy exception in the
context of arbitral awards derived from Mexican trust disputes.
However, those other situations could also probably arise in the context
of a typical commercial arbitration.
302 In addition to being written, a testamentary trust shall comply with
the solemnities and form validity requirements of testaments and wills.
See JOSE ARCE-Y-CERVANTES, DE LAS SUCESIONES 148 (Porrúa 10th edicion
2011).
303 The original in Spanish reads: “Es inoficioso el testamento en que no
se deje la pensión alimenticia, según lo establecido en este Capítulo.”
299
300
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subsist and were entitled to allowance at the time of death.304
An arbitral award giving effect to the terms of a revocable
testamentary trust that fails to consider as beneficiaries, to
the extent required by law,305 any legally protecteddependent, could be partially or totally set aside or refused
enforcement based on Mexican public policy. In principle,
the arbitral tribunal should have considered the mandatory
nature of Article 1374 and issued an arbitral award in those
terms. However, the arbitral tribunal may only consider the
application of Article 1374 on two conditions, the first being
where one of the parties involved has so requested. If not,
the award would be made ultra petita.306 The second is where
the party affected by or benefiting from such an award is a
party to the arbitration agreement. If the affected or
benefitting party is not a party to the agreement, the arbitral
tribunal would lack jurisdiction ratione personae, thus
demanding that the decision concerning the third person be
set aside or refused enforcement.307
The second case regards disputes arising out of socalled trusts over real estate located in the Mexican

Federal Civil Code, arts. 1368, 1371 (Mex.).
Pursuant to Mexican law the terms of the testamento inoficioso are
annulled only to the extent the total of the deceased’s estate is not
enough to provide alimony and allowance to the deceased’s protected
dependents.
306 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(ii)–(iv),
36(1)(a)(ii)–(iv); N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(i)(b)–(d);
Commercial Code, arts. 1457(I)(b)–(d), 1462(I)(b)–(d) (Mex.).
307 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 66, at arts. 34(2)(a)(i), 36(1)(a)(i);
N.Y. Convention, supra note 65, at art. V(1)(a); Commercial Code, arts.
1457(I)(a), 1462 (I)(a) (Mex.).
304
305
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Restricted Zone.308 Pursuant to Article 27(I) of the Mexico
Constitution, foreign persons are barred from acquiring
direct ownership of lands and waters within a hundred
kilometers along the country boarders and within fifty
kilometers of the seacoast.309 The usual way to circumvent
this constitutional prohibition is to hold the property in a
Mexican trust. Since foreigners cannot technically “buy”
property in that zone, the seller will act as settlor in order to
transfer the real property to the trustee, a bank’s fiduciary
department. The trustee then holds ownership title for the
benefit of the designated foreign beneficiary pursuant to
Articles 10-14 Mexico Foreign Investment Law.310 Arbitrators
may not disregard the mandatory provisions in the Mexican
Constitution and Foreign Investment Law. In this order of
ideas, arbitrators shall apply the ownership restrictions
regarding the real property transferred in trust. Any arbitral
decision granting property title to a foreign person in
contravention of the above mandatory provisions will be set
aside or refused enforcement in Mexico.
X.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing analysis suggests, arbitration of
Mexican trust disputes raises important issues that must be
kept in mind by parties and arbitrators. None of these issues,
however, present an insurmountable obstacle to the

The restricted zone is composed of land located 100 kilometers next to
international borders, and 50 kilometers from Mexican costliness. See
LIEX, art. 2o(VI) (Mex.).
309 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CP], art. 27(I),
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] (Feb. 5, 1917), últimas reformas
DOF Feb. 10, 2014 (Mex.).
310 See LIEX, arts. 10-14 (Mex.).
308
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arbitration process. Leaving aside claims pertaining to
minors or incapacitated persons that are perhaps specific to
family trust disputes, the issues analyzed above are not
exclusive to trust relationships. They are common in modern
arbitration involving non-signatories and more than two
parties.
As shown above, the contractual nature of the
Mexican trust (and generally of the trust institution in civil
law jurisdictions) relieves any arbitration from jurisdictional
challenges frequently faced by arbitral tribunals dealing
with Anglo-American trust claims in common law
jurisdictions. An arbitration provision contained in a
Mexican trust deed undoubtedly covers any disputes arising
out of or in connection with the trust agreement between
settlors, fiduciaries, and ascertainable beneficiaries.
Moreover, modern arbitration laws and institutional
rules are well-equipped with provisions to address nonsignatory and multi-party cases efficiently. Additionally,
careful design of arbitration clauses and early service of all
parties concerned by a trust dispute should enhance the
efficiency of the process in these cases.
Arbitration of Mexican trust disputes remains
underdeveloped. This may be due to the prevailingly small
number of domestic arbitrations taking place in Mexico
(compared to the large number of international arbitration
cases seated in Mexico or involving Mexican parties). There
are various possibilities as to why domestic arbitration
matters are much less prevalent than international ones: the
high cost of arbitration proceedings (in a country where
litigation before state courts is free), the deep-rooted court
litigation culture, lawyers’ unsound suspicion about the oneinstance process offered by arbitration, and insufficient
education and training on arbitration.
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However, in the case of trust arbitration, these
possibilities may not be valid. The trust lawyer community
in Mexico is a sophisticated one. Half of its lawyers work as
in-house counsel in highly specialized fiduciary departments
at banks and credit institutions authorized to act as trustees.
The other half of these lawyers are usually members of midsize or big law firms accustomed to deal with complex
contractual, financial, and corporate matters, many
involving foreign elements. The price of arbitration is
therefore not a concern. In the same vein, the one-time
nature of arbitration will always make sense for corporate
trustees who allocate more value to financial and legal cost
predictability.
The ultimate answer may lie in the fact that little has
been discussed about the specific advantages offered by
arbitration to trust parties and the issues that could arise this
field. Despite this article’s intention to furnish a compressive
analysis and strong evidence on the benefits of arbitration
for trust disputes and the legal compatibility between the
Mexican trust and various arbitration laws, additional
discussion and promotion are necessary in Mexico and in
other civil law jurisdictions.
In addition, empirical research about the perception
and use of arbitration among the members of the Mexican
trust community is necessary. The results of such empirical
research may clear out any invalid assumptions about
arbitration and pave the way towards a more significant role
for arbitration as a fair and efficient means to settle Mexican
trust claims.
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